Category Archives: Tribunal

Tax points and VAT groups – The Prudential Assurance Company Ltd CoA case

By Marcus Ward 11 April 2024

Latest from the courts

In the The Prudential Assurance Company Limited (Pru) Court of Appeal (CoA) case the issues were the “difficult” questions in respect of the relationship between the VAT grouping rules and the time of supply (tax point) legislation. Is VAT is applicable on a continuous supply of services where these services were supplied while the companies were VAT grouped, but invoices were issued after the supplier left the VAT group?

Background

Pru was at the relevant time carrying on with-profits life and insurance business. Silverfleet Capital Limited (Silverfleet) provided Pru with investment management services. Under an agreement dated 30 August 2002, the consideration which Silverfleet received for its services comprised a management fee calculated by reference to the amount of investments made during the period in which services were provided and performance fees, payable in the event that the performance of certain funds exceeded a set benchmark rate of return.

When Silverfleet was rendering its investment management services, Pru was the representative member of a VAT group of which Silverfleet was also a member. However, in 2007 a management buy-out was effected, as a result of which Silverfleet ceased to be a member of Pru’s VAT group. It also ceased to provide management services to Pru.

During 2014 and 2015, the hurdle rate set under the 2002 agreement was passed. Silverfleet accordingly invoiced Prudential at various dates between 2015 and 2016 for fees totalling £9,330,805.92 (“the Performance Fees”) plus VAT at 20%.

The Issues

The CoA considered whether the Performance Fees are subject to VAT.

The First-tier Tribunal (FTT) decided the point in favour of Pru. However, HMRC succeeded in an appeal to the Upper Tribunal (UT). In a decision that decision, the UT concluded that VAT was chargeable on the Performance Fees.

In its decision, the FTT queried whether regulation 90 of the VAT Regulations went so far as to direct that Silverfleet’s services had not been provided within a VAT group and had been “supplied in the course or furtherance of a business that in the VAT group world was not being carried on”. Further, the FTT was “unable to see what feature distinguishes [Prudential’s] case from that of the taxpayer in [B J Rice & Associates v Customs and Excise Commissioners]”.

In contrast, the UT considered that, pursuant to regulation 90 of the VAT Regulations, Silverfleet’s services were to be treated as having been supplied when invoiced and, hence, at a time when Silverfleet and Prudential were no longer members of the same VAT group. That being so, section 43 of VATA 1994 was not, in the UT’s view, in point. The UT also considered that the FTT had erred in regarding itself as bound by B J Rice & Associates v Customs and Excise Commissioners [1996] STC 581 (“B J Rice”) to allow the appeal. Unlike Mr Rice, the UT said in its decision, Silverfleet “was not entirely outside the scope of VAT when the Services were rendered, but rather it was subject to a specific set of assumptions and disregards”.

Pru contended that Silverfleet should not be considered to have made the supply in the course or furtherance of any business carried on by it. The business will instead be assumed to have been carried on by Pru. This was important because if VAT was applicable to the services Pru would not be in a position to recover it (in full at least) due to partial exemption which represented a large VAT cost.

Unsurprisingly, HMRC considered that output tax was due because at the tax point, Silverfleet as no longer part of the VAT group.

Legislation

The VAT Act 1994, section 43 lays down the rules in respect of VAT groups, and The VAT Regulations 1995, regulation 90 makes provision with respect to the time at which continuous supplies of services are to be treated as supplied for VAT purposes.

Section 43 explains that any supply by one member of a VAT group to another is to be “disregarded” and that “any business carried on by a member of the group shall be treated as carried on by the representative member”. Does this mean that no VAT is chargeable on an intra-group supply regardless of whether the supplier has left the group by the time consideration for the supply is the subject of a VAT invoice and paid? Or is section 43 inapplicable in respect of continuous supplies insofar as the consideration is invoiced and received only after the supplier is no longer a member of the VAT group because regulation 90 provides for the services to be treated as supplied at the time of the invoice or payment?

Decision

The appeal was dismissed and HMTC’s assessment was upheld. It was not possible to disregard the supply as intra-group and the tax point rules for the continuous supply of services meant that it was a taxable supply. The decision was not unanimous, with the decision by the judges being a 2:1 majority.

Commentary

This was a close decision and highlights the necessity of considering the interaction between VAT groups and tax points and the implications of timings. The case makes interesting reading in full (well, for VAT people anyway!) for the technical discussions and the disagreement between the judges.

VAT: Evidence for exports. The H Ripley case

By Marcus Ward 13 February 2024

Latest from the courts

In the H Ripley & Co Limited First Tier Tribunal (FTT) case the issue was whether the appellant had satisfactory evidence to support the zero rating of the export of goods (scrap metal).

Background

HMRC denied zero rating on the basis that the appellant did not provide satisfactory evidence to support the fact that the scrap metal was removed from the UK.

The requirements are set out in VAT Notice 725 para 5 and acceptable documentary evidence may include:

the customer’s order – including customer’s name and delivery address
inter-company correspondence
copy sales invoice
advice note
packing list
commercial transport documents from the carrier responsible for removing the goods from the UK, for example an International Consignment Note (CMR) fully completed by the consignor, the haulier and signed by receiving consignee
details of insurance or freight charges
bank statements as evidence of payment
receipted copy of the consignment note as evidence of receipt of goods abroad
a signed CMR document or note
a bill of lading
an airfreight invoice
an invoice from the carrier of the goods
official documents issued by a public authority, such as a notary, confirming the arrival of the goods
any other documents relevant to the removal of the goods in question which you would normally get in the course of business

or a combination of the above.

HMRC advised the appellant that it had received an information request from the Belgian tax authorities in respect of certain transactions and consequently, HMRC required information on the company’s documents in connection with the supplies. On receipt of the information HMRC concluded that the evidence was insufficient to support zero-rating so the sales were treated as standard rated and the appellant’s repayment claim was reduced to reflect this.

In these circumstances the burden of proof is on the appellant to show that it has satisfied the conditions set out in Notice 725 to zero-rate its supplies and provide documentation to show that the goods were removed from the UK.

Decision

The court noted that it was not HMRC’s position that supplementary evidence could not be provided post the required three-months period but that it was entitled to decline the additional evidence when it was provided some 18 to 30 months after the three-month period. It was clear that the evidence of removal must be obtained within three months and not that the valid evidence is brought into existence within the three-month time limit and obtained at some future date.

Notice 725 sets out the conditions which attach to the entitlement to zero-rate supplies. The FTT considered it to be clear from paragraph 4.3 and 4.4 (which have the force of law) that the onus is on the exporter company claiming zero-rating to gather sufficient evidence of removal within three months of the date of the supply. If it does not do so, it is not entitled to zero-rate the supplies.

Specifically, the court considered:

Sales Invoices – did not provide clear evidence that the goods were removed from the UK. Despite the invoices confirming the sale of scrap metal to a Belgium registered company it did not follow that the address of the purchaser is the same address as the destination that the goods were sent to.
Bank Statements – simply provided proof of payment they did not confirm who received the goods nor where the goods were delivered.
Weighbridge Tickets – merely confirm a consignment of scrap metal was sold to a Belgium based company and the goods were collected by a UK registered vehicle.
CMRs – none of the CMRs were fully completed by the haulier and signed by the receiving consignee.
P&O Boarding Cards –a taxpayer must have in its possession valid evidence of export within three months from the time of supply. The boarding cards were not provided to HMRC until 30 May 2018, some 18 to 30 months after the disputed consignments took place. It was not disproportionate for HMRC to state that the time limit for obtaining valid evidence of removal was three months and that the substantive requirements of Notice 725 had not been met. In any event, the court did not accept that the boarding cards evidence the exports of the scrap metal; none of the reference numbers on the boarding card match those used in any of the other documents and none of the lead names on the boarding cards match any of the other names in any other document. The boarding cards do not have any identifying features such that they may be matched with any of the disputed consignments.
E-mails and WhatsApp messages –none of the messages evidence that the loads were exported. At best they evidence a request from the buyer to a carrier to collect goods from the supplier’s yard and the WhatsApp messages were silent on whether the loads were exported from the UK.

The appeal was dismissed, and the assessments were upheld because none of the documents either individually or taken as a whole, were sufficient evidence to support zero-rating.

Commentary

Yet another case illustrating the importance of insuring correct documentation is held. It is not sufficient that goods leave the UK, but the detailed evidence requirements must always be met.

VAT: Input tax claim on Land Rovers. The Three Shires Trailers case

By Marcus Ward 9 February 2024

Latest from the courts

In the Three Shires Trailers Limited First Tier Tribunal (FTT) case the issues were whether an input tax claim on the purchase of two Land Rover Discoveries was appropriate when they were converted from commercial vehicles to cars, or was a self-supply triggered?

Background

The vehicles were commercial vehicles when purchased and input tax was recovered. Subsequently, they were converted by the addition of three fold up seats with seat belts behind the driver seat and removing materials which had blacked out the rear windows which reclassified them as cars. This would have subjected them to an input tax block if purchased in that state.

The purpose of buying the vehicles was for the transport of trailers to customers, the collection of trailers from suppliers and to enable personnel of the appellant to attend trade fairs all over the country.

Technical

“A Motor Car” is defined as:

“any motor vehicle of a kind used on public roads which has three or more wheels and either:

(a) is constructed or adapted solely or mainly for the carriage of passengers; or

(b) has to the rear of the driver’s seat roofed accommodation which is fitted with side windows or which is constructed or adapted for the fitting of side windows…”

Issues

The appellant stated that the vehicles were used only for business purposes. Employees were not permitted to use the vehicles for private purposes and did not do so. The vehicles were kept at the business’s premises. He also explained that the vehicles were not converted to cars, if they were cars, they were qualifying cars and if they were non-qualifying cars, the use was only temporary, and they were converted back to commercial vehicles.

Initially, HMRC disallowed the claim because the vehicles became cars and subject to the input tax block.

Subsequently, HMRC’s case was that the vehicles had been converted from commercial vehicles to non-qualifying cars which triggers an irreversible self-supply under Article 5 of the Value Added Tax (Cars) Order 1992 so output tax equalling the claimed input tax was due.

Decision

The FTT decided that, at the time when the vehicles were acquired, they were indisputably commercial vehicles and the appellant was entitled to deduct the input tax on them.

The judge found that, after conversion, the vehicles were intended for use, and were used, only for business purposes. The appellant did not intend that the vehicles should be used for private purposes and so far as he was aware, there was no private use. The vehicles were therefore qualifying motor vehicles eligible for input VAT recovery. No output tax was due on a self-supply.

The appeal was allowed.

Commentary

Another case on the recovery of input tax on car purchases and the difference between commercial vehicles and cars. It is notoriously difficult to persuade HMRC that there is no private use of cars, but it is possible.

VAT: Alternative Dispute Resolution guidance updated

By Marcus Ward 16 January 2024

HMRC has, this month, updated its guidance on how to use Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) to settle a tax dispute.

Anyone can apply for ADR to help resolve a dispute with HMRC, or to get more information about issues that need to be taken for a legal ruling. The Guidance explains how to apply for ADR and when you can use it to resolve a VAT disagreement with HMRC.

A full overview of the ADR system written by us here, but broadly, it is the involvement of a third party (a facilitator) to help resolve disputes between HMRC and taxpayers. Its aim is to reduce costs for both the taxpayer and HMRC when disputes occur and to reduce the number of cases that reach statutory review and/or Tribunal.

VAT treatment of serviced apartments: The Realreed Limited case

By Marcus Ward 11 January 2024

Latest from the courts

In this First-Tier Tribunal (FTT) case the issue was whether serviced apartments qualify for exemption.

Background

Realreed owns a property called Chelsea Cloisters in Sloane Avenue, London. The property comprises; 656 self-contained apartments and some commercial units. 421 of these apartments are let on long leases (no VAT issues arise from these supplies). The appeal concerned the VAT treatment of the letting of the remaining 235 apartments, which include studio, one-bedroom or two-bedroom self-contained rooms. The appellant has, at all times, received a significant number of occupiers from corporate customers when they relocate their employees to London for a specified period, such as a secondment.

The contentions

Realreed argued that the letting of the apartments is a supply of accommodation which is exempt under The VAT Act 1994, Schedule 9, Group 1, Item 1. Chelsea Cloisters operates like a ‘home from home’ for its tenants: it provides residential accommodation. The physical appearance of the building is very similar to that of other residential buildings in the vicinity. It does not have signage suggesting the serviced accommodation is a hotel or similar establishment. It is rare for hotels (or similar establishments) at the booking point to offer long-term availability in the same way as Realreed does. Chelsea Cloisters does not offer room service, or catering of any form. Tenants have fully functioning kitchens and other self-catering facilities within their apartments and have washing machines and dryers to do all their own laundry. Tenants can, and do, stay for extended periods of time (one for around 20 years). The business has always involved the provision of residential accommodation on a longer-term basis than would typically be found in a hotel, with a much higher degree of personal autonomy for the occupant.

HMRC contended that the use of the Apartments is carved out of the exemption in Item 1 by excepted item (d), which applies to “the provision in an hotel, inn, boarding house or similar establishment of sleeping accommodation”. Note 9 to Group 1 provides that “similar establishment” “includes premises in which there is provided furnished sleeping accommodation whether with or without the provision of board or facilities for the preparation of food, which are used or held out as being suitable for use by visitors or travellers”.

Decision

The court considered that Realreed provided sleeping accommodation in an establishment which is similar to a hotel. The two hallmarks of short-term accommodation coupled with additional services (daily maid service, linen changing, cleaning at the end of a stay, residents bar, concierge) mean that Chelsea Cloisters is an establishment in potential competition with the hotel sector, which also offers short-term accommodation with services.

The FTT found that Realreed provided furnished sleeping accommodation, so the remaining question was whether Chelsea Cloisters is used by or held out as being suitable for use by “visitors or travellers” per Note 9.

The FTT interpreted ‘visitor or traveller’ as referring to a person who is present in a particular place without making it their home, ie; they are not staying there with any degree of permanence. The average length of visit was less than a fortnight which must mean that the apartments were indeed made available to visitors or travellers.

The supplies were therefore standard rated.

Commentary

There is a distinction between leases and other room lettings for VAT. The most important issue is the degree of “permanence”, although other factors have a bearing. Businesses which let rooms should consider the nature of their supplies with reference to this case which helpfully sets out which factors need to be considered.

VAT: Best judgement; what is it, and why is it important?

By Marcus Ward 13 November 2023

If HMRC carry out an inspection and decide that VAT has been underdeclared (eg: either by understating sales, applying the incorrect VAT rate, or overclaiming input tax) an inspector has the power to issue an assessment to recover VAT that it is considered underdeclared. This is set out in The VAT Act 73(1)

“Where a person has failed to make any returns … or where it appears to the Commissioners that such returns are incomplete or incorrect, they may assess the amount of VAT from him to the best of their judgment and notify it to him”.

So, the law requires that when an inspector makes an assessment (s)he must ensure that the assessment is made to the best of their judgement, otherwise it is invalid and will not stand.

Guidance to surviving a VAT inspection here.

HMRC’s methods of assessing cash businesses here.

Definition of best judgment

Per Van Boeckel vs HMCE (1981) the judge set out three tests:

HMRC must make a value judgment on the material set before it honestly and bona fide and not knowingly set an inflated figure and then expect the taxpayer to disprove it on appeal
there must be material available
HMRC is not expected to do the work of the taxpayer but instead fairly interpret the material before it and come to a reasonable conclusion rather than an arbitrary one

If any of these three tests are failed, then best judgement has not been employed. However, the onus is on the appellant to disprove the assessment.

There were further comments on the matter:

“There are…obligations placed on the Commissioners to properly come to a view on the amount of tax that was due to the best of their judgement. In particular:

a value judgement must be made on the material put before them
they must perform their function honestly
there must be material on which to base their judgement
but they should not be required to do the job of the taxpayer, or carry out extensive investigations

This means that the assessing inspector must fairly consider all material placed before them and, on that material, come to a decision that is reasonable and not arbitrary, taking into account the circumstances of the business. In some cases, some “guesswork” may be required, but it should be honestly made based on the information available and should not be spurious, but HMRC must be permitted a margin of discretion.

Experience insists that it is usually more successful if the quantum of a best judgement assessment is challenged.

Where a business successfully disputes the amount of an assessment and the assessment is reduced, it will rarely fail the best judgement test.

In the case of MH Rahman (Khayam Restaurant) CO 2329/97 the High Court recognised the practice whereby the tribunal adopts a two-step approach, looking initially at the question of best judgement and then at the amount of the assessment. The message of the High Court appeared to be that the Tribunal should concern itself more with the amount of an assessment rather than best judgement.

Arguments which may be employed to reduce a best judgement assessment are, inter alia:

period of calculation is unrepresentative
wastage
discounts
staff use
theft
seasonal trends
competition
sales
opening hours
client base, etc

HMRC’s guidance to its own officers states that: Any assessments made must satisfy the best judgement criteria. This means that given a set of conditions or circumstances, “you must take any necessary action and produce a result that is deemed to be reasonable and not arbitrary”.

In other words, best judgement is not the equivalent of the best result or the most favourable conclusion. It is a reasonable process by which an assessment is successfully reached.

In the case of CA McCourtie LON/92/191 the Tribunal considered the principles set out in Van Boeckel and put forward three further propositions:

the facts should be objectively gathered and intelligently interpreted
the calculations should be arithmetically sound, and
any sampling technique should be representative

Tribunals will not treat an assessment as invalid merely because they disagree as to how the judgement should have been exercised. It is possible that a Tribunal may substitute its own judgement for HMRC’s in respect of the amount of the assessment. However, this does not necessarily mean that because a different quantum for the assessment was arrived at that the assessment failed the best judgement test.

Further, it is not the function of the Tribunal to engage in a process that looks afresh at the totality of the evidential material before it (M & A Georgiou t/a Mario’s Chippery, QB October 1995 [1995] STC 1101).

It should be also noted that even if one aspect of an assessment is found not to be made to best judgement this should not automatically invalidate the whole assessment – Pegasus Birds [2004] EWCA Civ1015.

Summary

There are significant difficulties in arguing that an inspector did not use best judgement and it is a high bar to get over.

In order to succeed on appeal, it would be required to be demonstrated, to the judge’s satisfaction, that the assessment was raised:

dishonestly
vindictively
capriciously
arbitrarily
spuriously
via an estimate or a guess in which all elements or best judgement are absent
wholly unreasonably

and that this action applies to the assessment in its entirety.

VAT: What is culture? The Derby Quad case

By Marcus Ward 6 November 2023

Latest from the courts

In the Derby Quad Ltd First-Tier tribunal (FTT) case the issue was whether the appellant’s supplies of admission to a screening were of a theatrical performance which would be cultural and exempt, or akin to a cinema presentation which is standard rated.

Background

A RSC live performance of The Tempest performed at Stratford-upon-Avon was live screened at The Quad venue in Derby by way of a broadcast – A so-called live event performed by a company other than DQ. The Quad is a comprehensive creative centre with indie cinema, art gallery, café-bar and event spaces for hire. DQ pays theatre companies a percentage of the proceeds from ticket sales to the screenings, and a small flat fee per simultaneous screening to help offset the satellite transmission costs.

The core of the dispute was whether the live events were a ‘live performance’ as required by The VAT Act 1994, Schedule 9, Group 13 item 2(b) for exemption.

The Arguments

The appellant contended that a live event was different from a cinematic film where the admission price is subject to VAT – it is an “experience”. The event is thought of as an experience on its own and is of artistic merit. It allows for audience participation and interaction even remotely.

To support this, it was stated that 84% percent of audiences “felt real excitement” because they knew the performance was being broadcast live that evening. Watching the show with others was also an important factor. Audiences tended to applaud at the end of the screening and they appear to feel connected to the performance and the audience. Further, the majority of audiences attending live events enjoyed the collective experience of watching as a group. This differs from audiences at cinemacasts of films and or recordings who typically watch as an individual or as a couple.

HMRC’s position was that admission charges to cinematic performances, and to live performances broadcast from other locations, were taxable.

Decision

The differences in the experiences of members of the audience and the actors/performers between a live theatre performance and at a live event are ones of kind, and not just degree, as they go to the essence of what makes and constitutes a theatrical performance and require interaction. A live event is, consequently, not capable of being a ‘theatrical performance’.

The actors in Stratford would receive no feedback from the audience in The Quad in a way they would from the audience at the live ‘physical’ event.

The FTT found that this is not a modern variant of a theatre performance and the appeal was dismissed.

Commentary

An interesting case which highlights the fact that subtle variations of supplies, and their interpretations can significantly affect the VAT outcome. In light of technical advances in this area we will need to watch how the definition of ‘theatrical performances’ develops.

VAT: Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) What is it? How does it work?

By Marcus Ward 15 September 2023

What is ADR?

ADR is the involvement of a third party (a facilitator) to help resolve disputes between HMRC and taxpayers. It is mainly used by SMEs and individuals for VAT purposes, although it is not limited to these entities. Its aim is to reduce costs for both parties (the taxpayer and HMRC) when disputes occur and to reduce the number of cases that reach statutory review and/or Tribunal.

The process

Practically, a typical process is; HMRC officials and the facilitator meet with the taxpayer and adviser in a room, and agree on what the disputes are. They then retire to two separate, private rooms, and the facilitator goes between the two parties and mediates on a resolution.

ADR is a free service and the only costs the taxpayer will incur are fees from their advisers on preparation and any representation they require on the day.

Features of ADR

Without prejudice discussions – Anything said or documents produced during the ADR process cannot be used in future proceedings without the express consent of both parties subject to the obligations placed on the parties by the operation of English law
Evidence is that ADR can work for both VAT and Direct Taxes disputes both before and after an appealable decision or assessment has been made. However, ADR for VAT disputes is more suited to post appealable decision and assessments
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and a Code of Conduct – a MOU is created to commit taxpayers/agents to the requirements of the ADR process
The average time for all completed ADR cases is 61 days. This figure is from application to resolution. The average elapsed time for VAT it is 53 days
The average age of VAT disputes is eight months
An ADR Panel has been created to accept or reject applications for ADR. It screens all applications and not just those where ADR was thought to be inappropriate.
Customer / Agent Questionnaire Summary – Findings from customers and agents included:
- An appreciation of the personal interaction that the ADR process allowed
- Facilitators were even handed and impartial in all cases and kept the taxpayer well informed
- ADR was particularly well suited to resolution of long standing disputes.

Is Tribunal preferable?

Taking a case to Tribunal is often an expensive, complicated and time consuming option, but used to be the only option open to a taxpayer to challenge a decision made to HMRC. From personal experience, the number of cases from which HMRC withdraw “on the steps of the court” illustrate a weakness in their legal procedures and possibly a lack of confidence in presenting their cases. This is very frustrating for our clients as they have already incurred costs and invested time when HMRC could have pulled out a lot earlier. Of course, our clients cannot apply for costs. The sheer number of cases going through the Tribunal process means that there are often very long and frustrating delays getting an appeal heard.

A true alternative?

Therefore, should we welcome ADR as a watered down version of a Tribunal hearing? Or is it actually something else entirely?

HMRC say that “ADR provides an excellent opportunity for Local Compliance to handle disputes in a modern and collaborative way. It is not intended to replace statutory internal review which is an already established process aimed at resolving disputes without a tribunal hearing. Review looks at legal challenges to decisions whereas ADR is more suitable for disputes where there might be more than one tenable legal outcome”.

Results so far

After an initial two-year pilot which shaped the final programme, and was guided by a Working Together group that included CIOT, AAT, ICAEW and legal representatives HMRC concluded that “ADR has shown that many disputes, where an impasse has been reached, can be resolved quickly without having to go to tribunal.” And “ADR is a fair and even-handed way of resolving tax disputes between HMRC and its customers and helps save time and costs for everyone.” Ignoring the dreadful use of the word “customers”… what has the profession made of the scheme?

Hui Ling McCarthy – Barrister has reported “HMRC’s ADR studies have produced extremely encouraging and positive results – owing in large part to HMRC’s willingness to engage with taxpayers, advisers and the professional bodies and vice versa. Taxpayers involved in a dispute with HMRC would be well-advised to take advantage of ADR wherever appropriate”.

Outcome

So what was the outcome of the two year scheme? The headline is that 58% of cases were successfully resolved, 8% were partially resolved and 34% were unresolved.

Of the fully resolved facilitations

33% were resolved by educating the taxpayer/agent about the correct tax position.
24% were resolved due to the facilitator obtaining further evidence.
23% were resolved by educating the HMRC decision maker about the correct tax position.
20% were resolved through facilitators restoring communication between both parties.

Conclusion

These figures are encouraging and the conclusion that; well planned, constructive meetings, with the intervention of an HMRC facilitator, do increase the chances of dispute resolution, appear to be well founded.

Further, the fact that the project team saw no evidence of any demand from HMRC, taxpayers or their agents for access to external mediators and that there is also conclusive evidence from taxpayers that HMRC facilitators have acted in a fair and even-handed manner add to the feeling that ADR is a useful new tool.

Commentary

The comments from HMRC on ADR is (probably understandable) positive. However, reactions from the profession and taxpayers who have gone through the process are equally generous on ADR as a mechanism for settling disputes.

My view is that any alternative to a Tribunal hearing is welcome and even if ADR works half as well as reports conclude then it should certainly be explored. It should definitely be considered as an alternative to simply accepting a decision from HMRC with which a taxpayer disagrees.

VAT: Powers of HMRC – The Impact Contracting Solutions Limited UT case

By Marcus Ward 5 September 2023

Latest from the courts

In the Impact Contracting Solutions Limited (ICS) Upper Tribunal (UT) case the issue was whether HMRC had the power to cancel the VAT registration where that person has facilitated the VAT fraud of another ie; the scope of the “Ablessio” principle. It also illustrates the impact of EU cases on UK courts.

Background

ICS’s customers were temporary work agencies, and its suppliers were approximately 3,000 mini-umbrella companies (“MUCs”) which supplied labour. HMRC decided to cancel ICS’s VAT registration number with reliance on the principle in the decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in Valsts ienemumu dienests v Ablessio SIA (C-527/11) (“Ablessio”). HMRC considered that ICS was registered for VAT principally or solely to abuse the VAT system by facilitating VAT fraud, and that, in such circumstances, they were empowered by the principle in Ablessio to cancel the registration. In particular, HMRC considered that the arrangements between ICSL and the MUCs were contrived, with the effect that the MUCs failed properly to account for VAT on their supplies to ICS.

ICS appealed against HMRC’s decision to cancel its registration.

The Issues

Does the principle in Ablessio apply only to a party that has itself fraudulently defaulted on its VAT obligations, or does it similarly apply to a party who has facilitated the VAT fraud of another party?

If the Ablessio principle does apply to a party who has facilitated the VAT fraud of another party, is simple facilitation sufficient, or must it additionally be proved that:

(a) the facilitating party was itself dishonest, or

(b) the facilitating party knew that it was facilitating the fraud, and/or

The First Tier Tribunal (FTT) decided that Ablessio applies both to a party that has fraudulently defaulted on its VAT obligations and to a party who has facilitated the VAT fraud of another party. Further that simple facilitation by a party of the VAT fraud of another is not sufficient to apply the Ablessio principle. However, it is not necessary to prove that the facilitating party was itself dishonest. It must, however, be proved that the facilitating party knew or should have known that it was facilitating the VAT fraud of another party.

Decision

The appeal was rejected an the FTT’s decision was upheld. HMRC powers are not contrary to UK VAT legislation.

The application by HMRC of Ablessio is not contra legem or otherwise prohibited by the VAT legislation where it is applied to deregister a taxpayer who has either fraudulently defaulted on its VAT obligations or facilitated the VAT fraud of another party and at the relevant time has also made taxable supplies unconnected with such fraud or facilitation of fraud and which would result in a liability to be registered.

Ablessio applies to the deregistration by HMRC of a person as well as to a refusal by HMRC to register a person. It also provides for the deregistration of a person who has facilitated the VAT fraud of another, where the person to be deregistered knew or should have known that it was facilitating the VAT fraud of another.

Commentary

This decision was released this month and illustrates the ongoing influence of EU legislation and cases, “despite” Brexit

EU legislation does not, by itself, fall within the scope of retained EU law (see below). However, domestic legislation implementing EU rules forms part of EU-derived domestic legislation and is preserved in domestic law.

The VAT Act 1994 is not affected by Brexit because it is an Act of Parliament and, therefore, remains effective unless it is changed by Parliament.

Overview of the impact of EU legislation

Post-Brexit, the UK could have decided that UK courts should not be bound by EU case law. However, this would have resulted in a situation where the UK courts effectively had to begin with a blank piece of paper in deciding how a piece of retained EU law should be interpreted or applied. This approach would have resulted in considerable uncertainty for business over how retained EU law would operate. In order avoid this, section 6 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 provides that:

CJEU judgments made on or before 31 December 2020 are binding on UK courts
CJEU judgments made after that date are not binding, but the UK courts are free to have regard to them, so far as they are relevant to the matter before the court.

Going forward

Helpful guidance is provided in the e-Accounting Solutions vs Global Infosys case (not a VAT case).

The Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Act 2023 means that the principle of EU-law conforming construction is a corollary of the supremacy of EU law (which is abolished under Section 3 of the Act) and will therefore no longer apply from 2024.

The principles of statutory construction under English Law require a purposive interpretation of legislation, whether or not EU law principles are engaged. This involves considering the context in which the legislation was made. Depending on the legislation concerned, this process may be guided by “external aids”. External aids referred to in the judgment include Explanatory Notes and Government White Papers, and could also presumably include references to Hansard where seen as appropriate by the courts. To the extent that domestic enactments were made for the purpose of implementing EU law, the EU law position is such an “external aid” and the UK law should be construed accordingly.

Where Parliament used the same language as the Directive, one may assume that it intended to mean the same – accordingly, the CJEU interpretation of Directive-terms informs the interpretation of the UK statute.

However, the statutory language remains paramount – “external aids”, to which EU law instruments are effectively downgraded in UK law from 2024, cannot displace unambiguous statutory language in UK enactments that is inconsistent with EU law.

VAT: Is a cosmetic treatment exempt medical care? The Illuminate Skin Clinics Ltd case

By Marcus Ward 12 July 2023

Latest from the courts

In the Illuminate Skin Clinics Ltd First-Tier Tribunal (FTT) case the issue was whether cosmetic procedures qualified as exempt medical treatment.

Background

The Appellant runs a private, ie; non-NHS clinic offering a range of aesthetic, skincare and wellness treatments advertised as: fat freezing, thread lifts, chemical peels, fillers, facials, intravenous drips and boosters. The Appellant’s sole director and shareholder, Dr Shotter, complies with Item 1 (below) in terms of qualifications, ie; she is enrolled on the register of medical professionals.

The list of treatments included:

Botox
Dermal fillers
CoolSculpting
Microsclerotherapy
Prescription skincare
Chemical peels
Microdermabrasion
Thread lifting
Thermavein
Aqualyx
Platelet-rich plasma treatment.

HMRC contended that these supplies were standard rated because there is no medical purpose behind the treatments, and they are carried out for purely cosmetic purposes. An assessment was raised for output tax on this income.

The Appellant argued that what it provided was exempt medical care via The VAT Act 1994, Schedule 9, Group 7, item 1 – “The supply of services consisting in the provision of medical care by a person registered or enrolled in any of the following:

The register of medical practitioners…”

And its contention was that the primary purpose of the treatments was “the protection, maintenance or restoration of the health of the person concerned”

In the Mainpay case it was established that “medical” care means “diagnosing, treating and, in so far as possible, curing diseases or health disorders”

Decision

Although there may have been a beneficial psychological impact on undergoing such treatments and this may have been the reason for a patient to proceed (and they may be recommended by qualified medical professionals) this, in itself, was insufficient to persuade the judge that the services were exempt. Consequety, the appeal was rejected and the assessment was upheld.

The FTT found that there was very little evidence of diagnosis. This was important to the overall analysis because diagnosis is the starting point of medical care. Without diagnosis, “treatment”, in the sense of the exemption, is not something which is being done responsively to a disease or a health disorder.

The fact that people go to the clinic feeling unhappy with some aspect of their appearance, and (at least sometimes) are happier when something is done at the clinic about that aspect of their appearance, does not mean that the treatment is medical, or has a therapeutic aim.

It was telling that the differentiation, in Dr Shotter’s own words, between what the clinic does from what “a GP or other health professional” does is; diagnosis. It also highlighted the general trend or purpose of the clinic’s activity – helping people to feel better about their appearance, in contexts where their appearance is not itself a health condition, or threatening to their health in a way which mandates treatment of their appearance by a GP or another health professional.

Helping someone to achieve goals in relation to their appearance, which is what this clinic did, is not treating someone’s mental health status, but is going to their self-esteem and self-confidence. It is a misuse of language to say that this is healthcare in the sense that it would fall within Item 1 of Group 7.

Commentary

There has been an ongoing debate as to what constitutes medical care. Over 20 years ago I was advising a large London clinic on this very point and much turned on whether patients’ mental health was improved by undergoing what many would regard as cosmetic procedures. We were somewhat handicapped in our arguments by the fact that many of the patients were lap dancers undergoing breast augmentation on the direction of the owner of the club…

It is worth remembering that not all services provided by a medically registered practitioner are exempt. The question of whether the medical care exemption is engaged in any given case will turn on the particular facts.

Further recent cases on medical exemption here and here.