Tag Archives: UT

Is the Upper Tribunal bound by High Court decisions?

By   11 July 2017

Upper Tribunal versus High Court

In the case of Meena Seddon Settlement which actually involved Inheritance Tax, the First Tier Tribunal (FTT) was required to decide whether the Upper Tribunal is bound by decisions made in the High Court. The FTT decision will doubtless affect VAT cases in the future.

It decided to follow a precedent set by the Upper Tribunal over an earlier decision by the High Court.

The taxpayer contended that the matter should be decided on the basis of a previous High Court decision. HMRC argued on the basis of a later Upper Tribunal decision. In normal circumstances, a later decision should take precedence over the earlier if both decisions have the same authority and have fully considered the previous judgments. However, if the taxpayer was correct to say that the Upper Tribunal was bound by precedents set by the High Court, the later decision could be disregarded as being wrong in law.

The FTT decided that it was the intention of Parliament that the Upper Tribunal was not bound to follow High Court precedents. This was notwithstanding the fact that a High Court could have a supervisory role over the Upper Tribunal in cases of judicial review. Therefore, it determined the case on the authority of the later Upper Tribunal decision in favour of HMRC.

VAT: Latest from the courts – extent of exemption for financial services

By   5 July 2017

Coinstar Limited

In the Upper Tribunal (UT) case of Coinstar Limited the issue was whether the services Coinstar provided were exempt supply of financial services via Value Added Tax Act 1994, Schedule 9, Group 5, item 1 – “The issue, transfer or receipt of, or any dealing with, money, any security for money or any note or order for the payment of money.”

Background

I’ve no doubt that you’ve seen those kiosks with machines in supermarkets into you which you tip your bag full of loose change in return for a voucher.  The voucher can then be redeemed at the checkout against the supermarket bill. Coinstar provides this service and charges 9.9% of the value of the coins inserted into the machine.  HMRC considered this to be a table service of “coin counting”, while Coinstar claimed that it was an exempt supply under the above legislation.

Decision

The UT affirmed the decision of the First Tier Tribunal and dismissed HMRC’s appeal, ruling that Coinstar was providing an exempt financial service. The Transaction was not a coin counting service, but a service of exchanging a less convenient means of exchange into a more convenient one which was provided in return for the 9.9% fee.  This involved a change in the legal and financial status of the parties such that the exemption applied.

Commentary

Another case which demonstrates the fine line between exemption and taxable treatment of “financial” services.  HMRC’s argument here was that this was a single supply of coin counting (which is outside the exemption) but clearly, a person emptying their big pots of change into the machine did not want it to be simply counted, the aim was to obtain a voucher in return for the shrapnel (or, if feeling philanthropic, there is an option to donate the coins to charity – for which Coinstar made no charge). It is fair to observe that just because a supply may be “financial” in nature it is not automatically exempt.  It pays to check the liability of such services because, as may be seen, HMRC often attack exempt treatment.  I have recently had to untangle a position where there was doubt about whether an online service amounted to exempt intermediary service. HMRC ultimately agreed that exemption applied in this case, but that was not their starting point.

VAT: Latest from the courts – Brockenhurst College

By   19 May 2017

The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has released its decision in Brockenhurst College here

Unusually, it has gone against the Advocate General (AG) Kokott’s opinion (here) and concurs with previous decisions reached by the UK courts. This is good news for the taxpayer and other providers of educational services. The decision has been referred back to the Court of Appeal (CoA) for it to consider points such as the distortion of competition and the fulfilment of a separate function, however, it is likely that this will not affect the decision by the CJEU and HMRC’s appeal will be dismissed.

Background

The case considered two types of supply made by Brockenhurst College:

  • The supplies made from its restaurant, used for training chefs, restaurant managers and hospitality students. The claim was made on the basis that these were exempt supplies of education and not standard rated supplies of catering
  • Tickets for concerts and other live performances put on by students as part of their educational courses. These were similarly claimed to be exempt.

Students were enrolled in performing arts and catering and hospitality courses.  As part of their course of study they were required to run a restaurant and stage live performances. Persons not enrolled on the relevant courses would pay for and attend these events. The services were usually supplied to a limited public including; parents, siblings, friends etc, and were supplied at a reduced cost as part of the practical element of the students’ education. The appellant argued that the experience was invaluable to their studies and should be regarded as ‘closely related’ to the principal supply of education.  HMRC considered that the services in question were supplied to third parties in return for payment. Consequently, the services, whilst of benefit and practical experience to the students were separate VATable supplies made to third parties and the supplies cannot, therefore, be closely related to the supply of education to the student.

The First Tier Tribunal (FTT) concluded that the supplies in question were exempt as being closely linked to education because:

  • the College was an eligible body and so its principal supplies were exempt supplies of education
  • the supplies were integral and essential to those principal exempt supplies
  • the supplies were made at less than their cost
  • the supplies were not advertised to the general public. Instead, there was a database of local groups and individuals who might wish to attend the restaurant or performances
  • the supplies were not intended to create an additional source of income for the College

HMRC disagreed with the conclusion on the basis that the supplies were outside the education exemption because the students were not the beneficiaries of the supplies in question, but only benefitted from making them. HMRC appealed to the Upper Tribunal (UT).

The UT rejected HMRC’s argument and agreed with the FTT. It held that the supplies were closely related to the exempt supplies of education because they enabled the students to enjoy better education. The requirement in the domestic law for the supplies to be for the direct use of the student was met because they were of direct benefit to him.

HMRC subsequently appealed to the CoA which referred it to the CJEU.

The AG’s opinion was that closely related transactions are to be regarded as independent supplies to the principal supply, but do not include the supply of restaurant or training services supplied to third parties who are not themselves receiving the principal supply of training. The third parties pay for their own consumption (of either the catering or performance) and do not pay for the provision of education. It is very rare that the CJEU makes a decision that goes against the AG’s opinion.

CJEU Decision

The CJEU ruled that activities consisting of students of a higher education establishment supplying, for consideration and as part of their education, restaurant and entertainment services to third parties, may be regarded as supplies closely related to the principal supply of education and accordingly be exempt from VAT – provided that those services are essential to the students’ education and that their basic purpose is not to obtain additional income for that establishment by carrying out transactions which are in direct competition with those of commercial enterprises liable for VAT, which it is for the national court to determine.

Action

We understand that there are a number of cases stood behind Brockenhurst.  Any other colleges, FE, universities or other eligible bodies carrying out similar activities to Brockenhurst need to consider their tax position. It is possible that retrospective claims may be made, depending on specific circumstances. Treating such supplies as exempt may also impact on a body’s partial exemption position and could create business/non-business implications. This may also impact on activities like hairdressing, motor maintenance and beauty treatments which colleges provide on a similar basis to the activities in this instant case.

We are happy to discuss the implications of this case with you.

VAT Latest from the courts – White Goods claims by housebuilders

By   27 February 2017

Recovery of input tax on goods included in the sale of a new house.

The recent Upper Tribunal (UT) case of Taylor Wimpey plc considered whether builders of new dwellings are able to recover input tax incurred on certain expenditure on goods supplied with the sale of a new house. We are aware that there are many cases stood behind this hearing and it is understood that the appellant’s claim amounts to circa £60 million alone. Unfortunately, the UT ruled against the appellant.

The rules

Before considering the impact of the case, I thought it worthwhile to look at the rules on this matter.

There is in place a Blocking Order (“Builders’ Block”) which prohibits recovery of input tax on goods which are not “building materials”. In most cases it is simple to determine what building materials are; bricks, mortar, timber etc, but the difficulty comes with items such as white goods (ovens, hobs, washing machines, dishwashers, refrigerators etc) carpets, and similar.  So what are the rules?

These are set out in HMRC’s VAT Notice 708 para 13.2

There are five criteria:

  • The articles are incorporated into the buildings (or its site)
  • the articles are “ordinarily” incorporated by builders into that type of building
  • other than kitchen furniture, the articles are not finished or prefabricated furniture, or materials for the construction of fitted furniture
  • with certain exceptions, the articles are not gas or electrical appliances
  • the articles are not carpets or carpeting material

To qualify as building materials, goods have to meet all of these criteria

Examples of specific goods are given at VAT Notice 708 para 13.8 

The case

Generally, Taylor Wimpey’s argument was that under the VAT law in force at the time of the claim it was entitled to recover the VAT paid on these items and the Builders’ Block did not prevent it from recovering input tax on these goods. The VAT was properly recoverable as it was attributable to the zero rated sale of the house when complete. Taylor Wimpey further contended that if the Builder’s Block did apply, it was unlawful under EU law and should therefore be disapplied.  Additionally, there was a challenge on the meaning of “incorporates … in any part of the building or its site” and the meaning of “ordinarily installed by builders as fixtures”.

The Builders’ Block which prevents housebuilders from reclaiming VAT on such goods was challenged on the basis that the UK was not allowed to extend input tax blocks, as it had done in 1984 (white goods) and 1987 (carpets).

The decision

The UT ruled that the block could be extended in relation to supplies which were zero-rated and that the block properly applied to most of appellants’ claim.  The UT held that only goods “ordinarily installed” in a house were excepted from the block, but that exception does not cover white goods and fitted carpets supplied since the appropriate rule changes.

Commentary

This ruling was not really a surprise and, unless Taylor Wimpey pursues this further it provides clarity.  It demonstrates that technology and the requirements of a modern house purchaser have moved on significantly since the 1970s and 1980s.  I doubt many houses built in the 1970s had dishwashers or extractor hoods.  The ruling does bear reading from a technical viewpoint as my summary does not go into the full reasons for the decision.  If you, or your client have a claim stood behind this case it is obviously not good news as claims for white goods are extremely limited.  If you have mistakenly claimed for white or similar goods, it would be prudent to review the position in light of this case.  The decision also affects claims via the DIY Housebuilder’s Scheme.  Details of this scheme here