Tag Archives: FTT

VAT – Catering at a university campus; exempt?

By Marcus Ward 3 September 2018

Latest from the courts

In the First Tier Tribunal (FTT) case of Olive Garden Catering Company Ltd (OGC) the mian issue was whether catering which was provided to the University of Aberdeen (UOA) students was an exempt supply. The specific issue was whether the catering was a supply “closely connected to education” which in turn depended on which entity was actually making the supply to students. For exemption to apply, OGC would need to be a principal in purchasing the food and other goods and an agent of UOA (pictured above) in delivering the catering (the exemption could not apply to a supply by OGC to the students).

Background

The central issue was whether the supply of food and staff by the appellant to UOA was a single supply of catering services at the standard-rate for VAT purposes (HMRC’s case) or that the main supply was for food at the zero-rate, with the supply of staff being a separate supply and eligible for staff wages concession which was the appellant’s stance. I comment that the procurement as principal and the delivery of catering as agent is common practice in the education sector and this case focussed on whether the relevant documentation actually reflected the economic reality.

Decision

The HMRC internal VAT manual VTAXPER64300 sets out the general principles for determining the VAT treatment of supplies made under a catering contract, which in turn depend in some situations on the capacity in which the caterer supplies its service, whether as principal or agent in the agreement. Of relevance in this case were the following statements:

(1) In general, it has been established practice that agency contracts are most often used in the education sector.

(2) Under agency contracts for the provision of catering it is accepted that:

The client makes a taxable supply of catering to the consumer, or the catering is subsumed within an overall exempt supply, eg; of education
VAT is not charged to the client on wages of the catering staff employed at the unit
VAT is charged on any management fee plus taxable stock and other services
Schools may only exempt supplies which are closely related to the overall provision of education

(3) This contributes to fair competition with in-house providers, and the contract catering industry acknowledges the value of that.

In respect of the contract for the supply of catering services, UOA was the principal and OGC was the agent by reference to the control exercised over; menu specifications, pricing, and the premises in which catering was carried out. The relevant contracts set out that the terms were set by UOA and were indicative of its status as the principal in the catering contract. The judge stated that the catering contracts between UOA and OGC appeared to be an agency contract with OGC acting as the agent. Consequently, the food produced OGC and served by its staff at UOA’s halls of residence was potentially a supply of food in the course of catering that can be subsumed within the overall exempt supply of education by UOA.

Commentary

A win for the appellant, but only after comprehensive consideration of all points and the substantial detailed documentation by the judge. There has been a run of Tribunal cases on the agent/principal point (not just in education and which I have covered in previous articles) and this case serves to demonstrate that each case will be determined on its merits. There can be no blanket VAT treatment and certain factors will point one way and others to a different VAT treatment. In my experience, HMRC are always eager to challenge agent/principal treatment and it is an area which has an enormous tax impact on a business. I always recommend that any contracts/documentation which cover potential agent/principal issues are reviewed to avoid unwanted attention from HMRC. Slight adjustments to agreements often assist in reaching the desired tax treatment. Don’t leave it to chance!

VAT: Adecco Court of Appeal case. Agent or principal?

By Marcus Ward 6 August 2018

Latest from the courts

In the recent Court of Appeal (CA) case of Adecco here the issue was whether the services provided by Adecco – an employment bureau which supplied its clients with temporary staff (temps) were by way of it acting as principal or agent.

Background

Details of the issues as considered in the FTT and UT were covered here

Overview

As is often the case in these types of arrangements, there are some matters that point towards the appellant acting as agent, and others indicating that the proper VAT treatment is that of principal. The important difference, of course, being whether output tax is due on the “commission” received by Adecco or on the full payment made to it (which includes the salaries of the relevant workers).

Decision

The CA decided that the supply of temporary staff by Adecco was as principal and consequently, VAT was due on the full amount received, not just the commission retained.

Reasoning

The CA focussed on the contractual position. Among the reasons provided for this decision were as follows (I have somewhat summarised). I think it worthwhile looking in some detail at these:

There was no question of the temps having provided their services under contracts with the clients: no such contracts existed. The contractual position must be that the temps’ services were provided to clients in pursuance of the contracts between Adecco and its clients and Adecco and the temps.
Although the contract between Adecco and a temp referred to the temp undertaking an assignment “for a client” and providing services “to the client”, it also spoke of the client requiring the temp’s services “through Adecco” and of the temp being supplied “through Adecco”.
While temps were to be subject to the control of clients, that was something that the temps agreed with Adecco, not the clients. The fact that the contract between Adecco and a temp barred any third party from having rights under the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 confirms that the relevant provisions were to be enforceable only by Adecco, which, on the strength of them, was able to agree with its clients that the temps should be under their control. Adecco can fairly be described as conferring such control on its clients. (Broadly; the employment regulations required Adecco to treat itself as a principal with the result that that it could not therefore treat itself as an agent).
Adecco paid temps on its own behalf, not as agent for the clients.
Adecco by did not drop out of the picture once it had introduced a temp to a client. It was responsible for paying the temp (and for handling national insurance contributions and the like) and had to do so regardless of whether it received payment from the client Adecco also enjoyed rights of termination and suspension. It is noteworthy (as the UT said) that the contract between Adecco and a temp proceeded on the basis that a temp’s unauthorised absence could “result in a breach of obligations which we owe to the client”.
Adecco did not perform just administrative functions in relation to the temps. The temps, after all, were entitled to be paid by Adecco, not the clients.
Adecco charged a client a single sum for each hour a temp worked. It did not split its fees into remuneration for the temp and commission for itself.
The fact that Adecco had no control over a temp in advance of his taking up his assignment with the client did not matter.
Adecco undoubtedly supplied the services of employed temps to its clients.
In all the circumstances, both contractually and as a matter of economic and commercial reality, the temps’ services were supplied to clients via Adecco. In other words, Adecco did not merely supply its clients with introductory and ancillary services, and VAT was payable on the totality of what it was paid by clients.

Action

Clearly this was not the outcome the appellant desired, and it may impact similar arrangements in place for other businesses. Although found on the precise nature of the relevant contracts, the outcome of this case is not limited to employment bureaux and similar but must be considered in most cases where commission is received by an “agent”. These may include, inter alia; taxi services, driving schools, transport, travel agents, training/education, online services, repairs, warrantee work and many other types of business. It is crucial that contracts are regularly reviewed the ensure that the appropriate VAT treatment is applied and that they are clear on the agent/principal relationship. If there is any doubt, please contact us as it is often one of the most ambiguous areas of VAT.

VAT – Zipvit Court of Appeal decision

By Marcus Ward 18 July 2018

Latest from the courts

The Zipvit Court of Appeal (CA) case here

Background

A full background of this long running case may be found here

In summary: It was previously decided that certain supplies made by Royal Mail (RM) to its customers were taxable. This was on the basis of the TNT CJEU case. RM had treated them as exempt. HMRC was out of time to collect output tax, but claims made by recipients of RM’s services made retrospective claims. These claims were predicated on the basis that the amount paid to RM included VAT at the appropriate rate (it was embedded in the charge) and that UK VAT legislation stipulates that the “taxable amount” for any supply, is the amount paid by the customer including any VAT included in the price. HMRC maintained that the absence of a VAT invoice showing that VAT was charged to Zipvit by RM, and giving details of the rate of tax and the amount charged, was fatal to Zipvit’s claim to recover input tax.

The decisions in the First Tier Tribunal (FTT) and the Upper Tribunal (UT) went against Zipvit so the appeal went to the CA.

Decision

The CA upheld the decisions in the previous courts. The appellant failed to demonstrate that the relevant VAT had been “due or paid” on the supplies received from RM. It further appeared that evidence which was not present at earlier hearings showed that the amounts paid were exclusive of VAT which meant that VAT was not embedded in the consideration paid.

Importance

In the words of the judge Lord Justice Henderson the appeal raised some important questions of principle in the law of VAT. They arise when supplies of goods or services, which were wrongly assumed by the parties to the relevant transactions and by HMR to be exempt from VAT at the time of supply, are later discovered to have been subject to the standard rate of tax when they were made, following a decision to that effect by the Court of Justice of the European Union. Where the recipient of those goods or services was itself a registered trader which made taxable supplies on which it accounted for output tax, the basic question is whether, once the true position has become known, the recipient is in principle entitled to recover as an input tax credit the tax element of the consideration which it paid for the original supplies. If so, does it make any difference if the supplier has failed to pay the tax which should have been paid on the original supplies, and if the recipient is in consequence unable to produce a tax invoice from the supplier showing the amount of the input tax which it seeks to recover?

So a fundamental tenet of VAT was considered, as well as the matter of this being the lead case behind which many others were stood. I understand that the quantum of claims submitted is circa £1 billion in total so there was a lot riding on this decision.

Commentary

In my view, this is an important case for the above technical reasons and the whole decision bears reading in order to understand some of the intricacies of a business claiming input tax.

Beyblades – a Customs Duty case

By Marcus Ward 17 July 2018

Latest from the courts

In the Court of Appeal (CA) case of Hasbro European Trading BV (Hasbro) the issue was whether Customs Duty (CD) was due on the import of Beyblades. If they fall within the definition of a toy CD is payable at 4.7%. However, if they are more accurately classified as a game they are treated as duty free – so a significant difference in import cost dependent on what, superficially, appears to be a somewhat question of semantics.

Beyblades

For the purposes of the case, it is important to understand what a Beyblade is and how it is used.

Beyblade is the brand name for a line of spinning tops originally developed and manufactured by Tomy in Japan. The main novelty is that they are a series of items which are customisable, with interchangeable parts. A Beyblade is set in motion by means of a rip-cord powered launcher.

A “game” is played with two players. Each player is allowed a number of Beyblades to choose from during a match. Players may use any parts available to them to make their Beyblades), but may not switch parts once a match has started. The first player to reach seven points wins. Points are awarded to the player based on how their Beyblade knocks out the opponent’s

One point is awarded if the opponent’s Beyblade stops spinning
One point is awarded if the opponent’s Beyblade is knocked out of the stadium or into a pocket on the edge of the ring
Two points are awarded if the opponent’s Beyblade breaks during a game

The Arguments

The case concerned the classification of Beyblades’. The appellant, Hasbro contended that Beyblades are correctly classified as “articles for … table or parlour games” under heading 9504 of the Combined Nomenclature. In contrast, HMRC maintained that Beyblades should be classified as “other toys” under heading 9503, The First-tier Tribunal FTT and the Upper Tribunal (U’) both previously agreed with HMRC’s analysis.

Classification

There are “explanatory notes” to the Harmonised System (HSENNs). The CA ruled that the classification rule which prefers the most specific description does not apply at the level of the HSENs: they are an important guide to interpretation, but do not have force of law.

The Decision

The CA allowed the appeal and went against the decisions in the FTT and UT. The judge concluded that “In the circumstances, it seems to me to fall to us to decide which of the alternative headings provides the more specific description. In my view, it is heading 9504. As I see it, “articles for … parlour games” encompasses a more limited range of goods than “toys” and “more clearly identifies Beyblades”, particularly since, as I say, “articles for … parlour games” reflects the fact that Beyblades are meant to be used in games…”. The fact that Beyblades are used in a competitive scenario seems to have swung the decision which knocked out HMRC. Consequently, there was no CD payable as they fell to be duty free.

Commentary

It does beg the question; why did this issue need to get to the CA for the appellant to finally win (but of course, this isn’t the first case which has raised that question). Perseverance was clearly the key word here. If you are convinced that HMRC is wrong on ay matter, it really does pay to challenge any ruling.

VAT: No such thing as a free meal (or drink) – The M&S case

By Marcus Ward 14 May 2018

Latest from the courts – Marks & Spencer First Tier Tribunal (FTT) case; what is the value of a “free” bottle of wine?

Background

I shall do this without the seductive TV ad voiceover… Like many retailers M&S has and does run various promotions designed to improve its financial performance. A number of those promotions are based on the proposition that a customer who buys certain products from M&S will receive something “free”. In this instant case, M&S sells a combination meal known as a “Dine In”. This comprises; a main course, a side dish and a pudding, along with a bottle of wine which is advertised as free: “Dine In for £10 with Free Wine”. I’m sure many have sampled these offers. The commercial rationale for the promotion involved M&S taking a calculated risk. It reached a decision to lower its aggregate profit margin on the separate items in the offer compared to their retail sales price in the expectation that this will be more than compensated for by changes in customer behaviour as a result of the promotion.

It is interesting to note that M&S anticipated the benefits could arise in a number of ways. Sales of the items included in the promotion might increase, which would improve turnover and put the retailer in a stronger negotiating position with its suppliers of those items. More casual customers might take up the promotion, increasing footfall. In doing so, they and other customers might take the opportunity to add other items to their shopping basket, the so-called “halo effect”. In a less tangible sense, the M&S’s brand might be generally enhanced.

In M&S’s online T&Cs the following narrative appears “For the avoidance of doubt, as the value attributed to the free wine in this deal is £0.00, if returned, no refund will be due…”

The aggregate shelf price of the three food items in the Dine In promotion, if bought separately, varied considerably but would always have been at least £10, and in most cases more.

The VAT issue

Should output tax be accounted for on the whole supply? Or, assuming that the food was zero rated, what, if any, output tax should be declared on the wine? Or should the entire supply be VAT free?

The contentions

M&S’s first contention was that the wine was free so no output tax was due. The reason why the wine was provided free was for M&S to receive certain benefits (set out above). Secondly, the Dine In Promotion is in fact two promotions. The first is an offer of three food items for £10. The second promotion, conditional on the first, is an offer of free wine. The former offer makes commercial sense both for M&S and the customer on its own terms. The food offer is complete in its own right, and the supply of wine for no consideration is a separate transaction. Thirdly, this is a multiple supply. The Dine In Promotion results in three or four separate supplies for VAT purposes, namely the three food items and the wine. This is not a case of what would otherwise be a single supply being artificially broken down. There are separate transactions, entitled to be valued separately for VAT. A further argument was that there is no separate or allocable consideration for the wine element of the Dine In Promotion. The free wine is an inducement, and is conditional on the food offer, but does not generate any separate identifiable consideration for VAT purposes.

Clearly HMRC disagreed and argued that the Dine In deal represented the sale of four items for £10. There was no free gift of the wine and consequently, an element of the £10 should be allocated to the value of the wine. Or put another way, it was a single promotional deal and is not a sale of food items for £10 plus a supply of wine for nil consideration. HMRC further contended that the duty to account for output tax and the right to deduct input tax form an “inseparable whole”. M&S’s position, if correct, would result in a failure to impose a charge to tax on the ultimate consumer, and untaxed (or, in effect, zero rated) consumption of standard rated goods and that militates very strongly against M&S’s position.

It was agreed that, by purchase value, the wine represented the most expensive part of the meal deal. HMRC proposed a value of output tax of 70 pence per meal deal was appropriate.

Decision

The judge agreed with HMRC and that output tax was due on the element of the £10 price attributable to the wine. Contractually, the meal deal was a single offer with a conditional element, ie; the provision of the wine was conditional on the customer paying £10 for the purchase of the food items. Although the customer may perceive the wine to be free (presumably as a result of the way in which the meal deal was held out and advertised) however, for VAT purposes, the customer paid £10 for all four elements of the deal. The Dine In promotion was a single offer, with all four items supplied simultaneously and in the same till transaction for consumption on the payment of £10. Receipt of the wine was conditional on payment of the £10 and the purchase of the food items. The wine was not provided unconditionally and with no strings attached.

Commentary

This was hardly a surprising decision. Similar retail offers have been considered in the past and the outcomes were broadly similar to this decision. The FTT distinguished Hartwell, Lex, Kuwait Petroleum, and Tesco plc cases in this respect which the appellants put forward to support their arguments. As always with VAT, promotions and offers can create valuation issues. It is important to consider VAT when marketing offers are provided.

UPDATE

July 2019

Via the Upper Tribunal (UT) case Marks and Spencer plc v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2019] BVC 514 the UT upheld the FTT decision and dismissed M&S’s appeal.

VAT – Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) What is it? How does it work?

By Marcus Ward 14 May 2018

ADR and VAT

What is ADR?

ADR is the involvement of a third party (a facilitator) to help resolve disputes between HMRC and taxpayers. It is mainly used by SMEs and individuals for VAT purposes, although it is not limited to these entities. Its aim is to reduce costs for both parties (the taxpayer and HMRC) when disputes occur and to reduce the number of cases that reach statutory review and/or Tribunal.

The process

Practically, a typical process is; HMRC officials and the facilitator meet with the taxpayer and adviser in a room, and agree on what the disputes are. They then retire to two separate, private rooms, and the facilitator goes between the two parties and mediates on a resolution.

ADR is a free service and the only costs the taxpayer will incur are fees from their advisers on preparation and any representation they require on the day.

Features of ADR

Without prejudice discussions – Anything said or documents produced during the ADR process cannot be used in future proceedings without the express consent of both parties subject to the obligations placed on the parties by the operation of English law
Evidence is that ADR can work for both VAT and Direct Taxes disputes both before and after an appealable decision or assessment has been made. However, ADR for VAT disputes is more suited to post appealable decision and assessments
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and a Code of Conduct – a MOU is created to commit taxpayers/agents to the requirements of the ADR process
The average time for all completed ADR cases is 61 days. This figure is from application to resolution. The average elapsed time for VAT it is 53 days
The average age of VAT disputes is eight months
An ADR Panel has been created to accept or reject applications for ADR. It screens all applications and not just those where ADR was thought to be inappropriate.
Customer / Agent Questionnaire Summary – Findings from customers and agents included:
- An appreciation of the personal interaction that the ADR process allowed
- Facilitators were even handed and impartial in all cases and kept the taxpayer well informed
- ADR was particularly well suited to resolution of long standing disputes.

Is Tribunal preferable?

Taking a case to Tribunal is often an expensive, complicated and time consuming option, but used to be the only option open to a taxpayer to challenge a decision made to HMRC. From personal experience, the number of cases from which HMRC withdraw “on the steps of the court” illustrate a weakness in their legal procedures and possibly a lack of confidence in presenting their cases. This is very frustrating for our clients as they have already incurred costs and invested time when HMRC could have pulled out a lot earlier. Of course, our clients cannot apply for costs. The sheer number of cases going through the Tribunal process means that there are often very long and frustrating delays getting an appeal heard.

A true alternative?

Therefore, should we welcome ADR as a watered down version of a Tribunal hearing? Or is it actually something else entirely?

HMRC say that “ADR provides an excellent opportunity for Local Compliance to handle disputes in a modern and collaborative way. It is not intended to replace statutory internal review which is an already established process aimed at resolving disputes without a tribunal hearing. Review looks at legal challenges to decisions whereas ADR is more suitable for disputes where there might be more than one tenable legal outcome”.

Results so far

After an initial two-year pilot which shaped the final programme, and was guided by a Working Together group that included CIOT, AAT, ICAEW and legal representatives HMRC concluded that “ADR has shown that many disputes, where an impasse has been reached, can be resolved quickly without having to go to tribunal.” And “ADR is a fair and even-handed way of resolving tax disputes between HMRC and its customers and helps save time and costs for everyone.” Ignoring the dreadful use of the word “customers”… what has the profession made of the scheme?

Hui Ling McCarthy – Barrister has reported “HMRC’s ADR studies have produced extremely encouraging and positive results – owing in large part to HMRC’s willingness to engage with taxpayers, advisers and the professional bodies and vice versa. Taxpayers involved in a dispute with HMRC would be well-advised to take advantage of ADR wherever appropriate”.

Outcome

So what was the outcome of the two year scheme? The headline is that 58% of cases were successfully resolved, 8% were partially resolved and 34% were unresolved.

Of the fully resolved facilitations

33% were resolved by educating the taxpayer/agent about the correct tax position.
24% were resolved due to the facilitator obtaining further evidence.
23% were resolved by educating the HMRC decision maker about the correct tax position.
20% were resolved through facilitators restoring communication between both parties.

Conclusion

These figures are encouraging and the conclusion that; well planned, constructive meetings, with the intervention of an HMRC facilitator, do increase the chances of dispute resolution, appear to be well founded.

Further, the fact that the project team saw no evidence of any demand from HMRC, taxpayers or their agents for access to external mediators and that there is also conclusive evidence from taxpayers that HMRC facilitators have acted in a fair and even-handed manner add to the feeling that ADR is a useful new tool.

Commentary

The comments from HMRC on ADR is (probably understandable) positive. However, reactions from the profession and taxpayers who have gone through the process are equally generous on ADR as a mechanism for settling disputes.

My view is that any alternative to a Tribunal hearing is welcome and even if ADR works half as well as reports conclude then it should certainly be explored. It should definitely be considered as an alternative to simply accepting a decision from HMRC with which a taxpayer disagrees.

VAT: Latest from the courts – Are loan administration services exempt?

By Marcus Ward 1 May 2018

In the First Tier Tribunal (FTT) case of Target Group Limited (Target) the appeal was against a decision by HMRC that loan administration services supplied by Target to a UK bank, Shawbrook Bank Limited (Shawbrook) were standard rated.

Background

Target contracted with Shawbrook to provide services related to loans provided by Shawbrook to its customers in the course of its lending business. Target’s description of its services was “loan account administration services” which amounted to Shawbrook outsourcing the management of the loans to Target. The services that Target provided covered the entire lifecycle of the loans, apart from the making of the initial loan. Target established loan accounts using its own systems, communicates with borrowers as an undisclosed agent of Shawbrook, and dealt with payments by borrowers and all administrative issues that arose. Target had limited discretion. The terms of the loans, including interest rates, were set by Shawbrook. Although Target is involved in dealing with arrears, any enforcement action would be a decision for Shawbrook. Specifically, the contract described Target as being “a provider of loan origination and account operation services” which “performs activities including the functions of: payment processing and servicing and portfolio management services”

Issue

It was accepted that Shawbrook made the loans (not Target) and that the services provided by Target were to Shawbrook and comprised a single (composite) supply for VAT purposes, rather than multiple supplies. Details of the definition between the two types of supply have been hot news in the VAT world for some time. My commentary on relevant recent case law here here here here here and here

The issue was the precise nature of the supplies and whether they qualified for exemption. The areas of dispute included whether Target’s supplies were excluded from exemption as debt collection, and whether the loan accounts fall to be treated as current accounts.

Target’s case was that the principal supply it made to Shawbrook related to payments and transfers in the same way as in the Electronic Data Services Ltd (EDS) case, which related to similar customer-facing loan administration services. (EDS provided loan arrangement and execution services to banks in relation to the granting of personal loans. The services included the provision of a staffed call centre, the printing and despatch of loan agreement documentation, the transfer of funds via the BACS system on the release of loans and the administrative work related to handling loan accounts and repayments). In the alternative, the principal or core supply relates to the operation of accounts (specifically, current accounts), or amounts to transactions concerning debts.

Technical

Article 135(1)(d) of the Council Directive 2006/112/EC (the Principal VAT Directive, or “PVD”) requires Member States to exempt the following transactions: “transactions, including negotiation, concerning deposit and current accounts, payments, transfers, debts, cheques and other negotiable instruments, but excluding debt collection;”

This is transposed into UK legislation via VAT Act 1994, Schedule 9, Group 5, items 1 and 8:

“Item 1. The issue, transfer or receipt of, or any dealing with, money, any security for money or any note or order for the payment of money. …

Item 8. The operation of any current, deposit, or savings account.”

Decision

It was decided that Target’s supplies did not qualify for exemption and they therefore fell to be standard rated. What was fatal to the appellant’s case was the fact that there was an absence of any involvement in the initial loan. Consequently, although it was possible to view the services as “transactions concerning payments” they fell within the debt collection definition and accordingly were not exempt. The judge also ruled that the supplies may be loan accounts, these did not qualify as an exempt operation of a current account.

Commentary

Of course, this decision was important for the recipient of the supply (Shawbrook) as well as Target. Because its supplies were exempt, the VAT on the outsourcing expenditure would be irrecoverable thus creating an extra 20% cost.

This case once again demonstrates that even the smallest variation of facts can produce an unexpected VAT outcome. Care must be taken to analyse precisely what is being provided. Financial Services is a minefield for VAT and it is certainly one area that assumptions of the VAT treatment should be avoided and timely advice sought.

Picture: A loan arranger (apologies)

Tax Tribunal backlog continues to increase

By Marcus Ward 26 April 2018

Both the First Tier Tribunal (FTT) and the Upper Tribunal (UT) which both hear VAT cases, report an increase in the number of cases waiting to be heard. In the case of the FTT the increase is 507 last year which means 28,521 cases are outstanding. The increase of UT cases outstanding is around 40%.

These are not all VAT cases and it is likely that the backlog is predominantly caused by

HMRC’s increased willingness to attack what they see as tax avoidance and evasion (see here)
More businesses being prepared to go to court
HMRC’s determination to “win on every point” rather than, perhaps, seeking a negotiated settlement, and
The increasing complexity of cases heard.

This backlog works in HMRCs favour as in the majority of cases the disputed tax must be paid before a hearing can take place. Delays may also cause anxiety and the burden of devoting resources to appeals which may cause the applicant to withdraw. It is not usually an inexpensive process to go to court and some cases can take a number of years to resolve.

In the current climate, it is more important than ever to challenge HMRC’s decisions. We have found that in the majority of cases we have been able to reduce HMRC assessments, in many cases, to zero. We always work on the basis that it is very important to try to resolve matters with HMRC before going to Tribunal. This is an increasingly difficult task given the political pressure on HMRC to reduce the tax gap (the difference between the amount of tax that should, in theory, be collected by HMRC, against what is actually collected) and the seemingly common tactic of HMRC becoming “entrenched” and being unprepared to shift their position.

Please contact us if you have a dispute with HMRC or are being challenged on any technical points. It is better to deal with these as soon as possible to avoid going to court.

VAT: Latest from the courts – option to tax, TOGC and deposits

By Marcus Ward 26 March 2018

Timing is everything

The First Tier Tribunal (FTT) case of Clark Hill Ltd (CHL) illustrates the detailed VAT considerations required when selling property. Not only are certain actions important, but so is timing. If a business is one day late taking certain actions, a VAT free sale may turn into one that costs 20% more than anticipated. That is a large amount to fund and will obviously negatively affect cashflow and increase SDLT for the buyer, and may result in penalties for the seller.

The case considered three notoriously difficult areas of VAT, namely: the option to tax, transfers of going concerns and deposits.

Background

CHL owned four commercial properties which had opted to tax. CHL sold the freehold of these properties with the benefit of the existing leases. As a starting point VAT would be due on the sale because of the option. However, the point at issue here was whether the conditions in Article 5 of the Value Added Tax (Special Provisions) Order 1995 were met so that the sale could be treated as a transfer of a business as a going concern (TOGC) and could therefore be treated as neither a supply of goods nor a supply of services for VAT purposes, ie; VAT free. The point applied to two of the four sales. The vendor initially charged VAT, but the purchasers considered that the TOGC provisions applied. CHL must have agreed and consequently did not charge VAT. HMRC disagreed with this approach and raised an assessment for output tax on the value of the sale.

TOGC

In order that a sale may qualify as a TOGC one of the conditions is that; the assets must be used by the transferee in carrying on the same kind of business, whether or not as part of any existing business, as that carried on by the transferor in relation to that part. It is accepted that in a property business transfer, if the vendor has opted to tax, the purchaser must also have opted by the “relevant date”. If there is no option in place at that time HMRC do not regard it as “the same kind of business” and TOGC treatment does not apply.

Relevant date

If the purchaser opts to tax, but, say, one day after the relevant date, there can be no TOGC. The relevant date in these circumstances is the tax point. Details of tax points here

Basically put, a deposit can, in some circumstances, create a tax point. In this case, the purchaser had paid a deposit and, at some point before completion of the transfer of the property, the deposit had been received by the seller or the seller’s agent. The seller notified HMRC of the option to tax after a deposit had been received (in two of the relevant sales). The issue here then was whether a deposit created a tax point, or “relevant date” for the purposes of establishing whether the purchaser’s option to tax was in place by that date.

Decision

The judge decided that in respect of the two properties where the option to tax was not notified until after a deposit had been paid there could not be a TOGC (for completeness, for various other reasons, the other two sales could be treated as TOGCs) and VAT was due on the sale values. It was decided that the receipt of deposits in these cases created a relevant date.

Commentary

There is a distinction between opting to tax and notifying that option to HMRC which does not appear to have been argued here (there may be reasons for that). However, this case is a timely reminder that VAT must be considered on property transactions AND at the appropriate time. TOGC is an unique situation whereby the seller is reliant on the purchaser’s actions in order to apply the correct VAT treatment. This must be covered off in contracts, but even if it is, it could create significant complications and difficulties in obtaining the extra payment. It is also a reminder that VAT issues can arise when deposits are paid (in general) and/or in advance of an invoice being issued.

We recommend that VAT advice is always taken on property transactions ad at an early stage. Not only can situations similar to those in this case arise, but late consideration of VAT can often delay sales and can even cause such transactions to be aborted.

VAT: Are digital newspapers newspapers?

By Marcus Ward 14 March 2018

Are digital newspapers zero rated?

Background

A long running argument has reached the First Tier Tribunal (FTT) in the case of The News Corp case. The issue was whether digital versions of newspapers should share similar VAT treatment to traditional paper newspapers (in this case; The Times, The Sunday Times, The Sun and The Sun On Sunday) and therefore be zero rated.

Arguments

The contention by the appellant was that the digital editions of the titles are “newspapers” on the basis that they are the digital equivalent of the daily editions produced on ordinary newspaper printing paper (“newsprint”). In respect of the process of news-gathering and journalism, there is no distinction between the newsprint and digital editions. Content is produced by a single newsroom under a single editor. The website and tablet editors sit within the newsroom team and are part of the journalistic process. Thus, the manner in which the newsprint and digital editions are compiled is identical until the point at which the content is laid out for transposition onto the physical or digital medium. There was, therefore, essentially no difference in the journalistic content or news teams for the newsprint and digital editions. It was also submitted that Item 2 Group 3 of Schedule 8 of VATA 1994 (below) should be interpreted purposively. The purpose of the provision was to promote literacy, the dissemination of information and democratic accountability. There was, however, a further principle of statutory interpretation which formed an important part of the appellant’s case. This principle was that legislation once enacted had to be kept up-to-date with, technological advances so that a statutory provision is “always speaking”. This was important in the present case because digital editions of newspapers did not exist in 1973 when VAT was introduced.

HMRC argued simply, that they do not fall within the definition of “newspapers” which is confined to newsprint newspapers.

Decision

Unsurprisingly, the appeal was dismissed on the grounds that digital newspapers are not covered by the zero rating provision at VAT Act 1994, Schedule 8, Group 3, which zero rates, inter alia, “newspapers” (Item 2). Group 3 provides as follows:

“Group 3—Books, etc
Item No
1 Books, booklets, brochures, pamphlets and leaflets.
2 Newspapers, journals and periodicals.
3 Children’s picture books and painting books.
4 Music (printed, duplicated or manuscript).
5 Maps, charts and topographical plans.
6 Covers, cases and other articles supplied with items 1 to 5 and not
separately accounted for…”

This relief clearly relates to physical goods. Consequently, it was necessary to determine whether digital newspapers are goods or services (which would not be covered by Group 3). It was decided that the supply in question was of “electronically supplied services” and this fact was fatal to the appellant’s case. Therefore the standard rate applied if the place of supply of the services was in the UK.

The judge further noted (on the “always speaking” point) that EC legislation contains a “standstill” date of 1 January 1991 with regard to zero rating by EU Member States. Thus, the CJEU held that the scope of zero rating provisions cannot be extended beyond their 1991 limits and that they must be interpreted strictly. In the judge’s view, to extend Item 2 Group 3 beyond the supply of goods (newsprint newspapers) to cover the supply of services (digital newspapers) would be an impermissible expansion of the zero rating provisions.

So the answer is; digital newspapers are not newspapers.