Tag Archives: CJEU

VAT: Charging EVs ruled to be goods not services

By   24 April 2023
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Latest from the courts

In the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) it was ruled that electric vehicle charging via public charging points, was a supply of goods, regardless that some elements of the supply were services, ie; access technical support, reservation of a charging point, and a parking space while charging. The overriding supply was the provision of electricity which is classified as goods.

The full P. In W. case here.

It is unlikely that the UK authorities will form a different view.

Although in most cases there is unlikely to be a significant difference, although there could be issues with the time of supply (tax point).

VAT: Intention is crucial – The Sonaecom case

By   18 May 2020
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We cannot control the future…

The Sonaecom case

In the opinion* of the CJEU AG (C-42/19) the importance of a taxpayer’s intention was of utmost importance, regardless of whether that intention was achieved.

Background

Sonaecom intended to acquire a telecoms provider company. As is usual in such cases, input tax was incurred on consultancy received, from, amongst others; accountants and legal service providers. The intention post acquisition was for Sonaecom to make certain charges to the acquired co. These would have been taxable supplies.

Unfortunately, the intended purchase was aborted.

 The issue

The issue before the AG was; as no taxable supplies took place as the deal fell through – to what should the input tax incurred on advice be attributed?

Opinion

In the AG’s view the fact that the acquisition was aborted was no reason for the claim for input tax to denied. This was based on the fact that:

  • Sonaecom was not a “pure holding company”
  • There was a genuine intention to make taxable supplies (to the acquired co)
  • There was a direct and immediate link between the costs and the intended supplies
  • Although the acquisition costs would exceed the proposed management charges, this was not a reason to invalidate the claim
  • The above analysis was not affected by the fact that the transaction did not take place

Commentary

There are often issues in relation to intentions of a taxpayer. It is clear, and was emphasised in this case, that intention is all important. Of course, intentions can change over a period of time and commercial and political events may thwart or cause intentions to be re-evaluated. There is often an issue about evidencing an intention. HMRC usually require comprehensive documentary evidence to demonstrate an objective. Such evidence is sometime not available for various reasons. Consequently, it is prudent for businesses to record (board meeting minutes etc at the very least) the commercial reasons for taking a certain course of action. This issue quite often arises in transactions in land and property – which can create additional technical issues.

There is legislation in place to cover situations when intentions, or actual events change and which affect the original input tax position: The Capital Goods Scheme (CGS) and The Value Added Tax Regulations 1995, Regs 108 and 109.

Other areas of VAT which often to raise issues are management charges and holding companies. HMRC apparently continue to be eager to attack taxpayers in these areas and I have looked at the role of holding companies and the VAT treatment here, here and here.

I think it is useful to bear in mind a question which, in itself does not evidence an intention, but provides commercial coherence – Why were the costs incurred if there was no intention to make the acquisition? This does leave aside the future management charges position but goes some way to provide business logic.

It will be interesting to see how this case proceeds, but I would find it very surprising if the court diverges from this AG opinion.

*  AG’s Opinion

The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) consists of one judge from each Member State, assisted by eleven Advocates General whose role is to consider the written and oral submissions to the court in every case that raises a new point of law, and deliver an impartial opinion to the court on the legal solution.

VAT: Extent of exemption for healthcare. The X-GmbH CJEU case

By   10 March 2020
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Latest from the courts

In the CJEU case of X, a German business, the issue was whether services provided by telephone could be treated as exempt. The decision is not available in English in the link above, so thanks to Google translate and very rusty schoolboy language skills!

Background

X provided a healthcare hotline to people covered by certain insurance. The types of services carried out where in respect of medical issues; medical advice, answers to queries, explanations of possible diagnoses and treatments, and patient support programmes for certain conditions. The service was provided by suitably qualified nurses, medical staff and doctors.

The issue

Was this service exempt from VAT as personal care considering it was “support” provided by telephone? He relevant legislation is Article 132(1)(c) of the VAT Directive. A separate issue was whether the staff required additional proof of their professional qualifications to qualify as an exempt service by telephone. The advice was provided via a computer assisted assessment, using targeted questions allowing X to assess the patient’s situation and to advise accordingly. Consequently, there was a degree of automation involved.

The German authorities considered that the supplies fell short of the exemption and raised assessments for output tax due on the services.

Decision

The CJEU has ruled that personal care is not dependent on where it is carried out and there is no bar to it being conducted by telephone. X contended that its services were directly connected with illness and was medical care and, as a result of its activities, the cost of subsequent treatment was reduced.

The court established that the supply was exempt if it met two tests:

  • it must be a service of personal care, and
  • it must be carried out within the framework of the exercise of the medical and paramedical professions as defined by the Member State concerned

Therefore, healthcare services carried out by telephone may fall within the exemption, but only if they meet all the conditions for applying this exemption. The test was not how the services were delivered.

Whether X’s services met the exemption conditions depended on case law and whether they were to;

  • diagnose, treat and cure illnesses or health anomalies
  • protect (including maintaining or restoring) the health of individuals.
  • explain diagnosis and therapies
  • propose modifications to treatments and medication

Such services were likely to have a ‘therapeutic purpose’. However, simply; directing patients to factsheets, providing specialists’ contact details and communicating information is insufficient to qualify for exemption and would be regarded as of a (taxable) administrational nature.

Summary

The services provided by telephone, consisting of providing advice on health and illness, were likely to be exempt, if they pursue a ‘therapeutic aim’. However, this was for the German referring court to verify. On the “additional qualifications” point, EU law does not define medical professions, so it is the responsibility of each Member State to determine the necessary qualifications. In the UK, these qualifications are set out at VAT Act 1994, Schedule 8, Group 7, item 1 (mainly; registered or enrolled as a doctor, optician, osteopath, chiropractor, nurse or midwife). It was decided that Article 132(1)(c) does not require that those X’s staff which provide telephone services to obtain additional professional qualifications.

Commentary

There is often significant uncertainty when businesses provide “healthcare”, This has mainly manifested in questions of whether staff or medical services are actually provided (and in more wide-ranging cases, whether the provision of staff is by way of agent or principal). However, with technology moving faster than ever, it is helpful to have these guidelines and the understanding that it is not just “old-fashioned” medical services which are covered by the exemption.

VAT: EC AG’s Opinion – Are aphrodisiacs food?

By   2 March 2020
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Latest from the courts

It’s rare to come across anything vaguely sexy about VAT, but hey ho, aphrodisiacs were the subject of the AG’s opinion in the case of “X” – the name of the Dutch business. The document was published by the European Commission (EC) and is here but unavailable in the English language, presumably as a result of Brexit, unless anyone knows of any other reason.

Opinion

 The AG, M. Maciej Szpunar decided that no, aphrodisiacs cannot be treated as food via Directive 2006/112/CE – Article 98 and are therefore not subject to a reduced rate (which would have been zero rated in the UK). The relevant element was:

“Foodstuffs” intended for human consumption “refers to products containing nutrients, and which are in principle consumed for the purpose of supplying said nutrients to the human body”. Products which are normally used to supplement or replace foodstuffs “Means products which are not foodstuffs, but which contain nutrients and are consumed in place of foodstuffs to supply these nutrients to the body, as well as products ingested in order to stimulate the nutritional functions of food or products used to replace them.

Therefore, in the AG’s opinion, the powders and capsules sold by X are different to foodstuffs and supplements and were not subject to the reduced rate. The fact that they may contain elements of nutrition did not override that they were intended to stimulate sexual desire and it was not the intention of the legislation that such products should be subject to the reduced rate as they were not “essential goods”.

That, of course, does not mean that foods which are said to contain aphrodisiac properties such as; asparagus, oysters, watermelons, celery and pomegranates are not reduced rated.

I doubt that Aphrodite – the Greek goddess of love and beauty, knew that ultimately there would be a court case on the rate of indirect tax applicable to such, err; “stimulants”.

AG’s Opinion

The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) consists of one judge from each member state, assisted by eleven Advocates General whose role is to consider the written and oral submissions to the court in every case that raises a new point of law, and deliver an impartial opinion to the court on the legal solution.

VAT: Payment handling charges – The Virgin Media case

By   5 February 2020
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Latest from the courts

In the Virgin Media Ltd First Tier Tribunal (FTT) case a number of issues were considered. These were:

  • whether payment handling charges were exempt via: The VAT Act 1994, Schedule 9, Group 5, items (1) and (5)
  • whether the supply was separate from other media services
  • which VAT group member made the supply?
  • whether there was an intra-group supply
  • whether there was an abuse of rights

Background

Virgin Media Limited (VML) provided cable TV, broadband and telephone services (media services) to members of the public. It was the representative member of a VAT Group which also contained Virgin Media Payment Limited (VMPL).

If customers choose not to pay by direct debit, they were required to pay a £5 “handling charge”. The handling charge was paid to VMPL and passed to VML on a daily basis. The issue was; what was the correct VAT treatment of the charge?

Contentions

The appellant argued that the £5 charge was optional for the customer and the collection of it was carried out by VMPL and was exempt as the transfer or receipt of, or any dealing with, money. Further, that, despite being members of the same VAT group, there was nothing in the legislation which forced the VAT group to treat supplies by separate entities within that group as a single supply to a recipient outside the group.

HMRC contended that there was a single taxable supply and thus no exempt services were provided and, in fact, VMPL was not making a supply at all (and therefore not to VML as the group representative member).  In the first alternative, if it were decided that there was a supply, such a supply was an ancillary component of a single taxable supply by VML as representative group member and not by VMPL as per the Card Protection Plan case. In the second alternative, if both decisions above went against HMRC, that the service provided by VMPL fell outside the exemption so that it was taxable in its own right.

Decision

It was found that:

  • there was a single supply made to customers
  • the supply was made by VML as the representative member of the VAT group
  • the £5 handling charge was an integral part of the overall supply
  • if not integral, the handling charge was an ancillary supply such that it took on the VAT treatment of the substantive supply
  • therefore, VMPL does not make any supply to the end users of the overall service
  • if VMPL does make a supply, it is an intra-group supply to VML which s disregarded for VAT purposes
  • VMPL does not have a free-standing fiscal identity for VAT purposes
  • if the FTT is wrong on the above points and VMPL does make a supply of payment handling services to customers, these supplies are taxable and not exempt (per Bookit and NEC) as the supply is simply technical and administrative and does not amount to debt collection
  • the arrangements do not constitute an abusive practice. The essential aim of the transactions are not to secure a tax advantage so HMRC’s argument on abuse fails

Therefore, the appeal was dismissed and a reference to the CJEU was considered inappropriate and output tax was due on the full amount received by the group from customers.

Summary

This was a complex case which suffered significant delays. It does help clarify a number of interconnected issues and demonstrates the amount of care required when planning company structures and the VAT analysis of them.

VAT: New guidance on Cryptoassets

By   9 January 2020
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HMRC Guidance

Further to my articles on cryptocurrencies here, here and here HMRC have update their guidance on cryptoassets which was published on 20 December 2019.

Background

VAT is due in the normal way on any goods or services sold in exchange for cryptoasset exchange tokens.

The value of the supply of goods or services on which VAT is due will be the pound sterling value of the exchange tokens at the point the transaction takes place.

Definition

Cryptocurrency (an example being Bitcoin) is a line of computer code that holds monetary value. Cryptocurrency is also known as digital currency and it is a form of money that is created by mathematical computations. In order for a Bitcoin transaction to take place, a verification process is needed, this is provided by millions of computer users called miners and the monitoring is called mining. Transactions are recorded in the blockchain which is public and contains records of each and every transaction that takes place. Cryptocurrency is not tangible, although they may be exchanged for traditional cash. It is a decentralised digital currency without a central bank or single administrator (which initially made it attractive) and can be sent from user to user on the peer-to-peer network without the need for intermediaries.

Cryptoassets

For VAT purposes, bitcoin and similar cryptoassets are to be treated as follows:

  • exchange tokens received by miners for their exchange token mining activities will generally be outside the scope of VAT on the basis that:
    • the activity does not constitute an economic activity for VAT purposes because there is an insufficient link between any services provided and any consideration; and
    • there is no customer for the mining service
  • when exchange tokens are exchanged for goods and services, no VAT will be due on the supply of the token itself
  • charges (in whatever form) made over and above the value of the exchange tokens for arranging any transactions in exchange tokens that meet the conditions outlined in VAT Finance manual (VATFIN7200), will be exempt from VAT under The VAT Act 1994, Schedule 9, Group 5, item

The VAT treatments outlined above are provisional pending further developments; in particular, in respect of the regulatory and EU VAT positions.

Bitcoin exchanges

In 2014, HMRC decided that under The VAT Act 1994, Schedule 9, Group 5, item 1, the financial services supplied by bitcoin exchanges – exchanging bitcoin for legal tender and vice versa – are exempt from VAT.

This was confirmed in the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) in the Swedish case, David Hedqvist (C-264/14). The appellant planned to set up a business which would exchange traditional currency for Bitcoin and vice versa. It was not intended to charge a fee for this service but rather to derive a profit from the spread (the difference between his purchase and sell price).

Questions were referred to the CJEU on whether such exchange transactions constitute a supply for VAT purposes and if so, would they be exempt.

The CJEU referred to the judgment in First National Bank of Chicago (C-172/96) and concluded that the exchange transactions would constitute a supply of services carried out for consideration.

The Court also ruled that the exchange of traditional currencies for non-legal tender such as Bitcoin (and vice versa) are financial transactions and fall within the exemption under VAT Directive Article 135(1) (e).

A supply of any services required to exchange exchange tokens for legal tender (or other exchange tokens) and vice versa, will be exempt from VAT under The VAT Act Schedule 9, Group 5 item 1.

Commentary

As always, the legislation and case law often struggles to keep pace with technology and new business activities. Although the focus of the guidance is more towards direct taxes, it is a helpful summary of HMRC’s interpretation of UK and EU law and decided case law.

VAT: Brexit referrals to CJEU

By   2 April 2019
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A quickie

What happens to referrals to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) after Brexit day?

Put simply, from the date the UK leaves the EU UK courts will no longer be able to refer cases to CJEU. Cases referred to CJEU before the date of leaving may still be heard.

We understand that there has been a late surge of referrals before the cut off date. This is likely to mean that there will be significant number of CJEU cases which can directly impact the UK for a time to come even though the UK is no longer a Member State.

This of course assumes that:

  • The UK leaves the EU
  • UK politicians do not actually agree some sort of compromise with the EU on this point
  • The Brexit date is not deferred for a long period (in which case referrals to, and decisions of, the CJEU will have direct relevance to UK VAT for many years, or even decades…).

VAT: More on the Mercedes Benz Financial Services case – PCP

By   1 March 2019
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Further to my article on the Mercedes Benz Financial Services (MBFS) case on Personal Contract Purchase (PCP), HMRC has published a Briefing Note – Changes to the VAT treatment of PCPs

HMRC has fully implemented the findings in the MBFS CJEU case. In summary, HMRC state that:

“The correct treatment of PCP and similar contracts depends on the level at which the final optional payment is set:

  • if, at the start of the contract, it is set at or above the anticipated market value of the goods at the time the option is to be exercised, the VAT treatment of the contract will follow the MBFS It is a supply of leasing services from the outset and VAT must be accounted for on the full value of each instalment, there is no advance, or credit, so there is no finance
  • if, at the start of the contract, it is set below the anticipated market value, such that a rational customer would buy the asset when they exercise the option, it is a supply of goods, with a separate supply of finance. VAT is due on the supply of goods in full at the outset of the contract, the finance is exempt from VAT”

This treatment must be used by 1 June 2019. Past declarations which have been in error must be adjusted per PN 700/45. Businesses affected by the changes may also need to consider adjustments to input tax claimed, or forgone in respect of partial exemption. A guide to partial exemption here.

VAT: Valuation – interest free credit

By   15 October 2018
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Latest from the courts. The Dixon Carphone plc (Dixon) First Tier Tribunal (FTT) case.

It considered the value of a retail sale where interest free credit was offered. Was it the amount paid by the consumer, or the amount actually received by Dixon after the deductions made by the credit supplier?

Background

The transactions which were the subject of this case are as follows:

  • a consumer purchases goods in a Dixon store and pays a deposit to Dixon
  • the balance of the cost of the purchase is funded by a loan, provided by a third-party loan company
  • the customer gives authority to the loan company to pay the money borrowed to Dixon
  • the customer loan is on favourable terms to the consumer as it is an interest free: “Buy Now, Pay Later” arrangement
  • the amount paid by the loan company to Dixon is a lower amount than that authorised by the consumer, following deduction of an amount described as a “Subsidy”.
  • the customer pays no interest on the amount borrowed if the full amount of credit is repaid by the customer within the “Pay Later” offer period.

Contentions

The appellant argued that the general rule, derived from the VAT Directive Article 73, is that the taxable amount is everything received by the supplier as consideration. In more complex cases, with more than one paying party, the consideration should be everything moving from each paying party and received by the supplier. Consequently, in these transactions there is a reduction in what was received by Dixon consequently, the taxable amount on which VAT should be calculated should be the amount received by Dixon from the loan company.

HMRC contended that output tax was due on the full selling price and that the other transactions did not impact the value of the supply.

Decision

As in a similar case which was decided at the CJEU: Primback Ltd C-34/99 ([2001] STC 803, The FTT decided that the loan company was providing the finance to the consumer who used the money to pay Dixon the full retail price of the goods. The loan company’s “Subsidy” did reduce the amount paid by the loan company directly to Dixon on behalf of the consumer, but this transaction did not affect the amount owed by the consumer for the goods.

The appeal was therefore dismissed.

Practical application

HMRC provide an example of the VAT treatment of interest free credit along the lines as follows:

Goods are sold for £600 on six months interest free credit terms.  As far as the customer is concerned, (s)he merely pays six instalments of £100 to the loan company.

Under separate arrangements between a loan company and the retailer, the loan company makes a deduction from the amount forwarded to the retailer, which accordingly, received only £560, not the full amount of £600. HMRC regard this deduction as third-party consideration, paid by the retailer for the loan made to the customer, and that output tax on £600 is due. Because there is no consideration, in the form of interest, paid by the customer on an interest-free loan, there is no supply for VAT purposes.

Commentary

The value of retail sales has often been an issue in the VAT world, whether it be interest free credit, credit card charges, BOGOF, or “bumping” in the motor industry. Care should be taken when deciding the value of consideration to be used for output tax declarations and advice should be sought if there is any doubt. It appears that the issue of interest free credit has now been killed off, but with ingenious marketing ideas always being created, VAT must be considered at an early stage.

VAT – Littlewoods compound interest Supreme Court judgement

By   6 November 2017
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Latest from the courts

The Littlewoods Limited case

This is a long running case on whether HMRC is required to pay compound interest (in addition to simple statutory interest) in cases of official error (Please see below for details of how the overpayment initially arose). Such errors are usually in situations where UK law is incompatible with EC legislation.  Previous articles have covered the progress of the case: here and here

Background

Littlewoods was seeking commercial restitution for overpayments of VAT previously made. It’s view was that an appropriate recompense was the payment of compound interest. It was accepted by all parties that statutory interest amounted to only 24% of Littlewoods’ actual time value loss from the relevant overpayments. There are many cases stood behind this case, so it was important for both taxpayers and HMRC.

Decision

The Supreme Court rejected Littlewoods’ claim for compound interest of circa £1.25 billion on VAT repayments of £205 million for the years 1973 to 2004. The court held that the correct reading of the VAT Act is that it excludes common law claims and although references are made to interest otherwise available these are clearly references to interest under other statutory provisions and not the common law. To decide otherwise would render the limitations in the VAT Act otherwise meaningless. Further, it held that the lower courts were wrong to construe the Court of Justice of the European Union’s (CJEU) requirement of an “adequate indemnity” as meaning “complete reimbursement”. The Supreme Court construed the term as “reasonable redress”.

The above reasoning was based on the following reasons:

  • They read the CJEU’s judgment as indicating that the simple interest already received by Littlewoods was adequate even though it was acknowledged to be only about 24% of its actual loss
  • It is the common practice among Member States to award simple interest with the repayment of tax. If the CJEU intended to outlaw that practice they would have said so
  • The reading “reasonable redress” is consistent with the CJEU’s prior and subsequent case law.

Implications

The Supreme Court ruling means that claims for compound interest in cases of official error cannot be pursued through a High Court claim. It would appear that, unless other appeals which are currently listed to be heard are successful, (extremely unlikely given the comments of the Supreme Court) this is the end of the road for compound interest claims.

History of the overpayment
During the period with which this case is concerned, the claimants Littlewoods carried on catalogue sales businesses. It distributed catalogues to customers and sold them goods shown in the catalogues. In order to carry on its businesses, it employed agents, who received a commission in return for their services. They could elect to be paid the commission either in cash or in kind. Commission was paid in cash at the rate of 10% of the sales achieved by the agent. Commission paid in kind took the form of goods supplied by Littlewoods, equal in price to 12.5% of the sales achieved by the agent.
As suppliers of goods, Littlewoods were obliged to account to HMRC for the VAT due in respect of their chargeable supplies. Between 1973 and 2004, they accounted for VAT on the supplies which it made to its agents, as commission paid in kind, on the basis that the taxable amount of those supplies was reduced by the enhancement in the commission, that is to say by 2.5%. On a correct understanding of VAT law, the taxable amount of the supplies was actually reduced by the entire 12.5% which constituted the agents’ commission. Consequently, Littlewoods accounted for and paid more VAT to HMRC than was due.