Tag Archives: VAT-case

VAT: Contact lens services – taxable or exempt? The Vision Direct case

By   8 December 2023

Latest from the courts

In the First-Tier Tribunal (FTT) case of Vision Dispensing Limited the issue was whether services linked to the online sale of prescription contact lenses were covered by the exemption at The VAT Act 1994, Schedule 9, group 7, item 1 (b) – the provision of medical care.

Generally speaking, opticians provide two types of supply

  • exempt medical care; sight tests, measuring and fitting
  • the standard rated supply of goods; spectacles, contact lenses, accessories etc

Almost always a customer pays a single amount which covers the services as well as the goods, so an apportionment is required. HMRC updated guidance on apportionment here.

Background

The Appellant “VDL” supplies services in connection with the online sale of contact lenses and this appeal was concerned with the question whether those supplies are subject to VAT at the standard rate.

The legislation provides for exemption for medical care by a person registered or enrolled in either of the registers of Ophthalmic Opticians or the register of Dispensing Opticians kept under the Opticians Act 1989. The exemption is also extended to persons who are not registered/enrolled under the Act but are directly supervised by a person who is so registered or enrolled.

VDL is a UK incorporated company and a member of the Vision Direct corporate group. VDL has a sister group company called Vision Direct BV (“VDBV”) which is based in The Netherlands. VDL operates a warehouse facility in the UK. Goods (contact lenses and other optical products) belonging to VDBV were stored in the warehouse and dispatched to purchasers by VDL, using its own workforce. VDL also employed customer assistants, who deal with a range of enquiries from customers. VDBV operates the website visiondirect.co.uk through which prescription contact lenses and other optical goods are supplied to UK customers. Customers purchasing prescription contact lenses or other optical products online enter two contracts; one with VDBV for the supply of contact lenses and one with VDL for the supply of dispensing services. There is also a contract between VDL and VDBV. VDL is not paid a fee by VDBV, its income comprises by the fee paid by customers.

The arguments

HMRC contended that there is little evidence to support that there was advice being provided to customs by VDL and consequently, there were serious questions about whether healthcare services are being supplied. The supplies fall short of a number of regulatory requirements and that the supplies described as dispensing services cannot properly be described as professional clinical advice or therapeutic care. HMRC stated that VDL has never seen a single customer. Clinical advice cannot be delivered in an impersonal or generic way.

HMRC pointed out that:

  • the website makes it clear that VDL does not provide advice on which customers can depend. Consequently, it cannot rely on the website as evidence of medical care
  • there is no direct link between the use of the website and payments to VDL. For there to be a supply, there must be a direct link between the supplier and the recipient

VDL contended that its dispensing services are superior to those available on the High Street. Contrary to HMRC’s case, it is able to identify multiple examples of clinical advice and the purpose of its supplies is to assist in the treatment of defective eyesight. All services are directly supervised by those with the appropriate qualifications.

Deliberation

The FTT was required to determine whether VDL’s services constituted medical care and were those services wholly performed or directly supervised by appropriate persons?

It was agreed that the advice does not need to be complex or personalised to be covered by the exemption as long as it contributes to the efficacy of the overall therapeutic process. The material provided on the website was comprehensive and covered the entire process from an eye test, the diagnosis of an eye defect, and then the selection, measuring and fitting of spectacles or lenses to the supply of those spectacles or lenses.

It was concluded by the FTT that the provision of the website was by VDBV as in the T&Cs VDBV operates it and owns the intellectual property rights to its content. Consequently, the provision of the website could not be part of the supply by VDL. VDL supplied the material or reviewed its content for VDBV pursuant to a contract between the two companies.

Decision

The FTT concluded that:

  • the quality, quantity, and nature of the optical information on the website was such that its provision could amount to medical care, but;
  • the information on the website is not provided by VDL (but by VDBV)
  • even if it were provided by VDL, the terms on which it is made available mean that it is not part of any supply made by VDL to customers and must be left out of account when it comes to characterising the supplies VDL does make
  • what VDL does do is choose the correct lenses and dispatch them. There is no element of medical care in VDL’s supply
  • there was little evidence as to how the opticians monitored the performance of the staff so that they could satisfy themselves that their performance was of a suitable standard, so it could not be said that there was direct supervision.

As a result, VDL did not provide medical care and in any case, the services were not wholly performed or directly supervised by appropriately qualified individuals so exemption could not apply

The appeal was dismissed.

Commentary

Opticians have long produced VAT challenges since the cases of Leightons and Eye-Tech in the 1990s. Any businesses using a similar business model are advised to review the treatment of their supplies in light of this case.

VAT: TOGC and deliberate errors – The Apollinaire case

By   19 December 2022

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In the First -Tier Tribunal (FTT) case of Apollinaire Ltd and Mr Z H Hashmi the issues were:

  • whether the appellant’s input tax claim was valid
  • were the director’s actions “deliberate”
  • was a Personal Liability Notice (PLN) appropriate?

Background

Mr Hashmi (the sole director of Apollinaire) asserted that he sold his business, Snow Whyte Limited to a Mr Singh as a going concern, together with the trading name “Benny Hamish”. The purchase price was never paid.  He alleged that Mr Singh traded for approximately one month and then sold stock worth £573,756 to Apollinaire. The appellant submitted an input tax claim for the purchase of the goods. HMRC refused to make the repayment and raised penalties for deliberate errors. HMRC subsequently issued a PLN to Mr Hashmi.

Issues

Initially HMRC stated that Mr Singh may not have existed, that there was no sale of Snow Whyte Ltd by Mr Hashmi to Mr Singh and similarly, no sale back to Mr Hashmi. However, this submission was later amended to argue that Mr Hashmi controlled the movement of the stock at all times and that the issue was whether the transfer of stock from Snow Whyte Limited was a Transfer Of a Going Concern (TOGC), whether or not Mr Singh existed.

Mr Hashmi appealed, contending that the transactions took place as described to HMRC.

Decision

Unsurprisingly, given Mr Hashmi’s previous history of dissolving companies, but continuing to trade under the same name as those companies (listed at para 14 of the decision) and failing to submit returns and payments, the FTT accepted HMRC’s version of events. Further, there was insufficient evidence to support the transactions (if they took place) and the judge fund that the appellant’s evidence was not credible. If the events did take place, there was no input tax to claim as all the tests (where relevant here) for a TOGC (Value Added Tax (Special Provisions) Order 1995, Regulation 5) were met:

  • the assets were sold as a business as a going concern
  • the assets were used by the transferee in carrying on the same kind of business
  • there was no break in trading
  • both entities traded under the same name
  • both entities operated from the same premises
  • both entities had the same employees and tills

The appeal was dismissed.

Penalties

The FTT further decided that HMRC’s penalties and PLN [Finance Act 2007, Schedule 24, 19(1)] were appropriate. The claim for input tax was deliberately overstated and that Mr Hashmi was the controlling mind of both entities and was personally liable as the sole company director of Apollinaire.

HMRC relied on case law: Clynes v Revenue and Customs[2016] UKFTT 369 (TC) which reads as follows:

“On its normal meaning, the use of the term indicates that for there to be a deliberate inaccuracy on a person’s part, the person must have acted consciously, with full intention or set purpose or in a considered way…

…Our view is that, depending on the circumstances, an inaccuracy may also be held to be deliberate where it is found that the person consciously or intentionally chose not to find out the correct position, in particular, where the circumstances are such that the person knew he should do so.” 

Commentary

This case is a reverse of the usual TOGC disputes as HMRC sought to establish that there was no taxable supply so no VAT was due. It underlines that:

  • care should always be taken with applying TOGC treatment (or appreciating the results of failing to recognise a TOGC)
  • penalties for deliberate errors can be significant and swingeing
  • directors can, and are, held personally responsible for actions taken by a company

VAT: Roof panels are not insulation. The Greenspace case

By   2 December 2021

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In the Upper Tribunal (UT) case of Greenspace Limited the issue was whether insulated roof panels were “energy-saving materials” per VAT Act 1994, sect 29A, Schedule 7A, group 2, items 1 and 2 and thus liable at the reduced rate of 5%. Or rather at the standard rate of 20% on the basis that they were a supply of a roof itself.

Background

The appellant supplied and installed roof panels for conservatories which comprised a layer of close-cell extruded polystyrene foam (Styrofoam) around 71mm thick. The Styrofoam was covered with a thin aluminium layer and a protective powder coating which are together around 2mm thick. The supplies were made to residential customers and the panels were fitted onto their pre-existing conservatory roofs. The Panels were slotted into place on the existing roof structure and Greenspace did not replace its customers’ existing roof framework when doing this; the struts and glazing bars that supported the previous glass or polycarbonate panels were left in place. Consequently, the Panels were not self-supporting and could only be used if the customer already had an existing conservatory roof structure.

The decision

The First-tier Tribunal (FTT) decided in 2020 that the panels were not “insulation for a roof” but were a new roof in their own right, and that the appellant’s supplies did not therefore qualify for the reduced rate of VAT (unlike insulation that could be separately attached to a roof, the panels actually formed the roof).

The UT dismissed the new appeal and found that the FTT had not been obliged to compare the roof after Greenspace had installed its panels to the original roof. The frame that was retained could not itself be described as a roof, and the provision of the Thermotec panels which made the conservatory weatherproof as well as insulating it could properly be categorised as the provision of a new roof.

One of Greenspace’s grounds of appeal was that the FTT decision was vitiated by the assumption that because the panels took the form of roof coverings, they were necessarily incapable of constituting “insulation for … roofs”. The appellant argued that as this was a flawed assumption (that Greenspace’s supplies “must” be treated as something more than insulation) the decision should be set aside. This contention was rejected by the UT judge.

Commentary

A fine distinction is often required to be made to establish the correct VAT treatment of a supply. In this case a degree of semantics was required to determine whether the panels were energy-saving materials (even when they certainly saved energy). On such small things turned the assessment of £2.6 million here. It always pays to double check VAT treatments rather than making assumptions.

VAT: DIY housebuilders can make more than one claim – The Ellis case

By   18 October 2021

Latest from the courts

In the First Tier Tribunal (FTT) case of Andrew Ellis and Jane Bromley [2021] TC08277, the issue was whether a person constructing their own house can make more than one claim for VAT incurred.

Background

The DIY Housebuilder’s Scheme enables a DIY housebuilder to recover VAT incurred on the construction of a house in which the constructor will live. Details here.

In this case, the specific issue was whether, despite the HMRC guidance notes on the scheme claim form explicitly stating that only one claim can be made, whether two claims may be submitted and paid by the respondent.

The appellant constructed a house over a period of five years (he was a jobbing builder and the work was generally only undertaken at weekends and holidays). To aid cash flow, an initial claim was made, followed by a second two years later.

The relevant legislation is The VAT Act 1994 section 35.

Decision

The appeal was allowed. The FTT found that HMRC’s rule that only one claim could be made under the DIY housebuilder’s scheme was ultra vires and that multiple claims should be permitted.

The judge stated that …there is no express indication that only one claim may be made. Like many provisions, section 35 VATA is drafted in the singular. Drafting in the singular is an established technique to assist in clarity and to enable the proposal to be dealt with succinctly.  As there is no express indication to the contrary in section 35 VATA, section 6 Interpretation Act 1978 applies to confirm that the reference to “a claim” in section 35 VATA must be read as including “claims”.

Commentary

This is good news for claimants who often must wait a number of years for a house to be built and therefore carry the VAT cost until the end of the project.

This case presumably means that it is possible to make claims as the project progresses and there is no need to wait until completion.

We await comment on this case from HMRC, but it is hoped that clarification will be forthcoming on whether the result of this case will be accepted.

VAT: Unjust enrichment. The Deluxe case

By   13 January 2021

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In the Deluxe Property Holdings Limited High Court case (Deluxe) the issue was whether a VAT claim needed to be passed back to the supplier after a correction – whether the unjust enrichment applied.

Background

Deluxe employed SCL Construction Limited (SCL) to carry out building works. SCL raised invoices in respect of the construction of student accommodation at 20%. It was, however, common ground that the works were in fact zero-rated. SCL recovered the overcharged VAT from HMRC via a VAT Act 1994 Section 80 claim. SCL undertook to repay the amount of VAT to Deluxe via section 10 of VAT Notice 700/45. Without such written reimbursement undertaking, HMRC would have been entitled to refuse the claim. SCL did not make the payment to Deluxe.

Issue

The issue between the parties was whether:

  • SCL holds the accounting credit obtained from HMRC on trust for Deluxe, or;
  • the claim is only in debt, in which case SCL sought to set-off such the claim against other monies that it alleges are owed by Deluxe

Decision

The court ruled that SCL had undertaken to reimburse its customer all of the amount credited by HMRC without any deduction, for whatever purpose. Further, SCL had undertaken that it could not use the credit for any other purpose. It was a payment made by HMRC for the sole and express purpose of allowing SCL to reimburse the mistakenly charged VAT to Deluxe and was clearly intended to restrict SCL’s freedom of disposal so that the credit was to be exclusively used for the stated purpose without set-off.

Although SCL gave its undertaking to HMRC rather than to Deluxe to pass on the money, it held the repayment on trust for Deluxe and gave rise to a Quistclose Trust*

Additionally, a constructive trust arose because it would be unacceptable for SCL to derive a benefit of the VAT repayment.

The court found that SCL has acted in breach of trust and is liable as trustee to restore the trust fund and transfer to Deluxe the balance of the trust property without offsetting it against amounts that it claimed it was owed by Deluxe.

Commentary

This is a logical and expected decision and the reasoning is helpful for similar disputes.

*  A trust may arise where one person, A, advances money to another, B, on the understanding that B is not to have the free disposal of the money and that it may only be applied for the purpose stated by A. The effect of the trust is to reserve in A the beneficial interest in the money, so providing him with some proprietary security for his advance.

VAT: Education and catering – University Of Southampton Students’ Union case

By   6 November 2020

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In the University Of Southampton Students’ Union (USSU) First Tier Tribunal (FTT) case the issue was the VAT treatment of supplies of hot food and coffee; whether the appellant was an eligible institution making principal supplies of education or vocational training and/or whether supplies of hot food and coffee closely related to such principal supplies.

Background

USSU argued that both the supply of hot food and coffee by the USSU shop are exempt via The VAT Act 1994 Schedule 9, group 6, Item 4(a) and note 1(e) as supplies made by an eligible body which makes principal supplies of vocational training, and which are closely related to the (exempt) principal supply of education by the University of Southampton or vocational training by USSU. In the alternative, exemption applies for matters closely related to supplies of education by a third party via a published HMRC concession (and its supplies were within HMRC’s conditions for such a concession).

HMRC disagreed and claimed that these supplies were not closely related to education and that USSU was not an eligible body (no ring fencing of the profits such that they were not necessarily reinvested in its own supplies of education). Therefore, the supplies were properly taxable, and they declined to pay the appellant’s claim of overpaid output tax. The respondent also cited the Loughborough Students’ UnionUpper Tribunal (UT) case.

Decision

The appeal was dismissed for the following reasons:

  • USSU did not satisfy the definition of vocational training
  • the supplies of hot food and coffee were not closely related to a supply of education or vocational training
  • USSU did not satisfy the definition of an “eligible body”

Commentary

Superficially, the claim seemed good. Para 5.5 of PN 709/1 states: “If you’re a student union and you’re supplying catering (including hot takeaway food) to students both on behalf, and with the agreement, of the parent institution, as a concession you can treat your supplies in the same way as the parent institution itself. This means that you can treat your supplies as exempt when made by unions at universities.. This means that most supplies of food and drink made by the union, where the food is sold for consumption in the course of catering will be exempt… For example, food and drink sold from canteens, refectories and other catering outlets (excluding bars), plus food and drink sold from vending machines situated in canteens and similar areas.”

However, the Notice then goes on to add “But it does not cover food and drink sold from campus shops, bars, tuck shops, other similar outlets and certain vending machines…”

This appeal looks a close-run thing, but it demonstrates that small differences in detail can produce different VAT outcomes. We urge all Student Unions and other entities “attached” to education providers to review their position.