Tag Archives: VAT-FTT

Tax points and VAT groups – The Prudential Assurance Company Ltd CoA case

By Marcus Ward 11 April 2024

Latest from the courts

In the The Prudential Assurance Company Limited (Pru) Court of Appeal (CoA) case the issues were the “difficult” questions in respect of the relationship between the VAT grouping rules and the time of supply (tax point) legislation. Is VAT is applicable on a continuous supply of services where these services were supplied while the companies were VAT grouped, but invoices were issued after the supplier left the VAT group?

Background

Pru was at the relevant time carrying on with-profits life and insurance business. Silverfleet Capital Limited (Silverfleet) provided Pru with investment management services. Under an agreement dated 30 August 2002, the consideration which Silverfleet received for its services comprised a management fee calculated by reference to the amount of investments made during the period in which services were provided and performance fees, payable in the event that the performance of certain funds exceeded a set benchmark rate of return.

When Silverfleet was rendering its investment management services, Pru was the representative member of a VAT group of which Silverfleet was also a member. However, in 2007 a management buy-out was effected, as a result of which Silverfleet ceased to be a member of Pru’s VAT group. It also ceased to provide management services to Pru.

During 2014 and 2015, the hurdle rate set under the 2002 agreement was passed. Silverfleet accordingly invoiced Prudential at various dates between 2015 and 2016 for fees totalling £9,330,805.92 (“the Performance Fees”) plus VAT at 20%.

The Issues

The CoA considered whether the Performance Fees are subject to VAT.

The First-tier Tribunal (FTT) decided the point in favour of Pru. However, HMRC succeeded in an appeal to the Upper Tribunal (UT). In a decision that decision, the UT concluded that VAT was chargeable on the Performance Fees.

In its decision, the FTT queried whether regulation 90 of the VAT Regulations went so far as to direct that Silverfleet’s services had not been provided within a VAT group and had been “supplied in the course or furtherance of a business that in the VAT group world was not being carried on”. Further, the FTT was “unable to see what feature distinguishes [Prudential’s] case from that of the taxpayer in [B J Rice & Associates v Customs and Excise Commissioners]”.

In contrast, the UT considered that, pursuant to regulation 90 of the VAT Regulations, Silverfleet’s services were to be treated as having been supplied when invoiced and, hence, at a time when Silverfleet and Prudential were no longer members of the same VAT group. That being so, section 43 of VATA 1994 was not, in the UT’s view, in point. The UT also considered that the FTT had erred in regarding itself as bound by B J Rice & Associates v Customs and Excise Commissioners [1996] STC 581 (“B J Rice”) to allow the appeal. Unlike Mr Rice, the UT said in its decision, Silverfleet “was not entirely outside the scope of VAT when the Services were rendered, but rather it was subject to a specific set of assumptions and disregards”.

Pru contended that Silverfleet should not be considered to have made the supply in the course or furtherance of any business carried on by it. The business will instead be assumed to have been carried on by Pru. This was important because if VAT was applicable to the services Pru would not be in a position to recover it (in full at least) due to partial exemption which represented a large VAT cost.

Unsurprisingly, HMRC considered that output tax was due because at the tax point, Silverfleet as no longer part of the VAT group.

Legislation

The VAT Act 1994, section 43 lays down the rules in respect of VAT groups, and The VAT Regulations 1995, regulation 90 makes provision with respect to the time at which continuous supplies of services are to be treated as supplied for VAT purposes.

Section 43 explains that any supply by one member of a VAT group to another is to be “disregarded” and that “any business carried on by a member of the group shall be treated as carried on by the representative member”. Does this mean that no VAT is chargeable on an intra-group supply regardless of whether the supplier has left the group by the time consideration for the supply is the subject of a VAT invoice and paid? Or is section 43 inapplicable in respect of continuous supplies insofar as the consideration is invoiced and received only after the supplier is no longer a member of the VAT group because regulation 90 provides for the services to be treated as supplied at the time of the invoice or payment?

Decision

The appeal was dismissed and HMTC’s assessment was upheld. It was not possible to disregard the supply as intra-group and the tax point rules for the continuous supply of services meant that it was a taxable supply. The decision was not unanimous, with the decision by the judges being a 2:1 majority.

Commentary

This was a close decision and highlights the necessity of considering the interaction between VAT groups and tax points and the implications of timings. The case makes interesting reading in full (well, for VAT people anyway!) for the technical discussions and the disagreement between the judges.

VAT: Evidence for exports. The H Ripley case

By Marcus Ward 13 February 2024

Latest from the courts

In the H Ripley & Co Limited First Tier Tribunal (FTT) case the issue was whether the appellant had satisfactory evidence to support the zero rating of the export of goods (scrap metal).

Background

HMRC denied zero rating on the basis that the appellant did not provide satisfactory evidence to support the fact that the scrap metal was removed from the UK.

The requirements are set out in VAT Notice 725 para 5 and acceptable documentary evidence may include:

the customer’s order – including customer’s name and delivery address
inter-company correspondence
copy sales invoice
advice note
packing list
commercial transport documents from the carrier responsible for removing the goods from the UK, for example an International Consignment Note (CMR) fully completed by the consignor, the haulier and signed by receiving consignee
details of insurance or freight charges
bank statements as evidence of payment
receipted copy of the consignment note as evidence of receipt of goods abroad
a signed CMR document or note
a bill of lading
an airfreight invoice
an invoice from the carrier of the goods
official documents issued by a public authority, such as a notary, confirming the arrival of the goods
any other documents relevant to the removal of the goods in question which you would normally get in the course of business

or a combination of the above.

HMRC advised the appellant that it had received an information request from the Belgian tax authorities in respect of certain transactions and consequently, HMRC required information on the company’s documents in connection with the supplies. On receipt of the information HMRC concluded that the evidence was insufficient to support zero-rating so the sales were treated as standard rated and the appellant’s repayment claim was reduced to reflect this.

In these circumstances the burden of proof is on the appellant to show that it has satisfied the conditions set out in Notice 725 to zero-rate its supplies and provide documentation to show that the goods were removed from the UK.

Decision

The court noted that it was not HMRC’s position that supplementary evidence could not be provided post the required three-months period but that it was entitled to decline the additional evidence when it was provided some 18 to 30 months after the three-month period. It was clear that the evidence of removal must be obtained within three months and not that the valid evidence is brought into existence within the three-month time limit and obtained at some future date.

Notice 725 sets out the conditions which attach to the entitlement to zero-rate supplies. The FTT considered it to be clear from paragraph 4.3 and 4.4 (which have the force of law) that the onus is on the exporter company claiming zero-rating to gather sufficient evidence of removal within three months of the date of the supply. If it does not do so, it is not entitled to zero-rate the supplies.

Specifically, the court considered:

Sales Invoices – did not provide clear evidence that the goods were removed from the UK. Despite the invoices confirming the sale of scrap metal to a Belgium registered company it did not follow that the address of the purchaser is the same address as the destination that the goods were sent to.
Bank Statements – simply provided proof of payment they did not confirm who received the goods nor where the goods were delivered.
Weighbridge Tickets – merely confirm a consignment of scrap metal was sold to a Belgium based company and the goods were collected by a UK registered vehicle.
CMRs – none of the CMRs were fully completed by the haulier and signed by the receiving consignee.
P&O Boarding Cards –a taxpayer must have in its possession valid evidence of export within three months from the time of supply. The boarding cards were not provided to HMRC until 30 May 2018, some 18 to 30 months after the disputed consignments took place. It was not disproportionate for HMRC to state that the time limit for obtaining valid evidence of removal was three months and that the substantive requirements of Notice 725 had not been met. In any event, the court did not accept that the boarding cards evidence the exports of the scrap metal; none of the reference numbers on the boarding card match those used in any of the other documents and none of the lead names on the boarding cards match any of the other names in any other document. The boarding cards do not have any identifying features such that they may be matched with any of the disputed consignments.
E-mails and WhatsApp messages –none of the messages evidence that the loads were exported. At best they evidence a request from the buyer to a carrier to collect goods from the supplier’s yard and the WhatsApp messages were silent on whether the loads were exported from the UK.

The appeal was dismissed, and the assessments were upheld because none of the documents either individually or taken as a whole, were sufficient evidence to support zero-rating.

Commentary

Yet another case illustrating the importance of insuring correct documentation is held. It is not sufficient that goods leave the UK, but the detailed evidence requirements must always be met.

VAT: Input tax claim on Land Rovers. The Three Shires Trailers case

By Marcus Ward 9 February 2024

Latest from the courts

In the Three Shires Trailers Limited First Tier Tribunal (FTT) case the issues were whether an input tax claim on the purchase of two Land Rover Discoveries was appropriate when they were converted from commercial vehicles to cars, or was a self-supply triggered?

Background

The vehicles were commercial vehicles when purchased and input tax was recovered. Subsequently, they were converted by the addition of three fold up seats with seat belts behind the driver seat and removing materials which had blacked out the rear windows which reclassified them as cars. This would have subjected them to an input tax block if purchased in that state.

The purpose of buying the vehicles was for the transport of trailers to customers, the collection of trailers from suppliers and to enable personnel of the appellant to attend trade fairs all over the country.

Technical

“A Motor Car” is defined as:

“any motor vehicle of a kind used on public roads which has three or more wheels and either:

(a) is constructed or adapted solely or mainly for the carriage of passengers; or

(b) has to the rear of the driver’s seat roofed accommodation which is fitted with side windows or which is constructed or adapted for the fitting of side windows…”

Issues

The appellant stated that the vehicles were used only for business purposes. Employees were not permitted to use the vehicles for private purposes and did not do so. The vehicles were kept at the business’s premises. He also explained that the vehicles were not converted to cars, if they were cars, they were qualifying cars and if they were non-qualifying cars, the use was only temporary, and they were converted back to commercial vehicles.

Initially, HMRC disallowed the claim because the vehicles became cars and subject to the input tax block.

Subsequently, HMRC’s case was that the vehicles had been converted from commercial vehicles to non-qualifying cars which triggers an irreversible self-supply under Article 5 of the Value Added Tax (Cars) Order 1992 so output tax equalling the claimed input tax was due.

Decision

The FTT decided that, at the time when the vehicles were acquired, they were indisputably commercial vehicles and the appellant was entitled to deduct the input tax on them.

The judge found that, after conversion, the vehicles were intended for use, and were used, only for business purposes. The appellant did not intend that the vehicles should be used for private purposes and so far as he was aware, there was no private use. The vehicles were therefore qualifying motor vehicles eligible for input VAT recovery. No output tax was due on a self-supply.

The appeal was allowed.

Commentary

Another case on the recovery of input tax on car purchases and the difference between commercial vehicles and cars. It is notoriously difficult to persuade HMRC that there is no private use of cars, but it is possible.

VAT treatment of serviced apartments: The Realreed Limited case

By Marcus Ward 11 January 2024

Latest from the courts

In this First-Tier Tribunal (FTT) case the issue was whether serviced apartments qualify for exemption.

Background

Realreed owns a property called Chelsea Cloisters in Sloane Avenue, London. The property comprises; 656 self-contained apartments and some commercial units. 421 of these apartments are let on long leases (no VAT issues arise from these supplies). The appeal concerned the VAT treatment of the letting of the remaining 235 apartments, which include studio, one-bedroom or two-bedroom self-contained rooms. The appellant has, at all times, received a significant number of occupiers from corporate customers when they relocate their employees to London for a specified period, such as a secondment.

The contentions

Realreed argued that the letting of the apartments is a supply of accommodation which is exempt under The VAT Act 1994, Schedule 9, Group 1, Item 1. Chelsea Cloisters operates like a ‘home from home’ for its tenants: it provides residential accommodation. The physical appearance of the building is very similar to that of other residential buildings in the vicinity. It does not have signage suggesting the serviced accommodation is a hotel or similar establishment. It is rare for hotels (or similar establishments) at the booking point to offer long-term availability in the same way as Realreed does. Chelsea Cloisters does not offer room service, or catering of any form. Tenants have fully functioning kitchens and other self-catering facilities within their apartments and have washing machines and dryers to do all their own laundry. Tenants can, and do, stay for extended periods of time (one for around 20 years). The business has always involved the provision of residential accommodation on a longer-term basis than would typically be found in a hotel, with a much higher degree of personal autonomy for the occupant.

HMRC contended that the use of the Apartments is carved out of the exemption in Item 1 by excepted item (d), which applies to “the provision in an hotel, inn, boarding house or similar establishment of sleeping accommodation”. Note 9 to Group 1 provides that “similar establishment” “includes premises in which there is provided furnished sleeping accommodation whether with or without the provision of board or facilities for the preparation of food, which are used or held out as being suitable for use by visitors or travellers”.

Decision

The court considered that Realreed provided sleeping accommodation in an establishment which is similar to a hotel. The two hallmarks of short-term accommodation coupled with additional services (daily maid service, linen changing, cleaning at the end of a stay, residents bar, concierge) mean that Chelsea Cloisters is an establishment in potential competition with the hotel sector, which also offers short-term accommodation with services.

The FTT found that Realreed provided furnished sleeping accommodation, so the remaining question was whether Chelsea Cloisters is used by or held out as being suitable for use by “visitors or travellers” per Note 9.

The FTT interpreted ‘visitor or traveller’ as referring to a person who is present in a particular place without making it their home, ie; they are not staying there with any degree of permanence. The average length of visit was less than a fortnight which must mean that the apartments were indeed made available to visitors or travellers.

The supplies were therefore standard rated.

Commentary

There is a distinction between leases and other room lettings for VAT. The most important issue is the degree of “permanence”, although other factors have a bearing. Businesses which let rooms should consider the nature of their supplies with reference to this case which helpfully sets out which factors need to be considered.

VAT: Contact lens services – taxable or exempt? The Vision Direct case

By Marcus Ward 8 December 2023

Latest from the courts

In the First-Tier Tribunal (FTT) case of Vision Dispensing Limited the issue was whether services linked to the online sale of prescription contact lenses were covered by the exemption at The VAT Act 1994, Schedule 9, group 7, item 1 (b) – the provision of medical care.

Generally speaking, opticians provide two types of supply

exempt medical care; sight tests, measuring and fitting
the standard rated supply of goods; spectacles, contact lenses, accessories etc

Almost always a customer pays a single amount which covers the services as well as the goods, so an apportionment is required. HMRC updated guidance on apportionment here.

Background

The Appellant “VDL” supplies services in connection with the online sale of contact lenses and this appeal was concerned with the question whether those supplies are subject to VAT at the standard rate.

The legislation provides for exemption for medical care by a person registered or enrolled in either of the registers of Ophthalmic Opticians or the register of Dispensing Opticians kept under the Opticians Act 1989. The exemption is also extended to persons who are not registered/enrolled under the Act but are directly supervised by a person who is so registered or enrolled.

VDL is a UK incorporated company and a member of the Vision Direct corporate group. VDL has a sister group company called Vision Direct BV (“VDBV”) which is based in The Netherlands. VDL operates a warehouse facility in the UK. Goods (contact lenses and other optical products) belonging to VDBV were stored in the warehouse and dispatched to purchasers by VDL, using its own workforce. VDL also employed customer assistants, who deal with a range of enquiries from customers. VDBV operates the website visiondirect.co.uk through which prescription contact lenses and other optical goods are supplied to UK customers. Customers purchasing prescription contact lenses or other optical products online enter two contracts; one with VDBV for the supply of contact lenses and one with VDL for the supply of dispensing services. There is also a contract between VDL and VDBV. VDL is not paid a fee by VDBV, its income comprises by the fee paid by customers.

The arguments

HMRC contended that there is little evidence to support that there was advice being provided to customs by VDL and consequently, there were serious questions about whether healthcare services are being supplied. The supplies fall short of a number of regulatory requirements and that the supplies described as dispensing services cannot properly be described as professional clinical advice or therapeutic care. HMRC stated that VDL has never seen a single customer. Clinical advice cannot be delivered in an impersonal or generic way.

HMRC pointed out that:

the website makes it clear that VDL does not provide advice on which customers can depend. Consequently, it cannot rely on the website as evidence of medical care
there is no direct link between the use of the website and payments to VDL. For there to be a supply, there must be a direct link between the supplier and the recipient

VDL contended that its dispensing services are superior to those available on the High Street. Contrary to HMRC’s case, it is able to identify multiple examples of clinical advice and the purpose of its supplies is to assist in the treatment of defective eyesight. All services are directly supervised by those with the appropriate qualifications.

Deliberation

The FTT was required to determine whether VDL’s services constituted medical care and were those services wholly performed or directly supervised by appropriate persons?

It was agreed that the advice does not need to be complex or personalised to be covered by the exemption as long as it contributes to the efficacy of the overall therapeutic process. The material provided on the website was comprehensive and covered the entire process from an eye test, the diagnosis of an eye defect, and then the selection, measuring and fitting of spectacles or lenses to the supply of those spectacles or lenses.

It was concluded by the FTT that the provision of the website was by VDBV as in the T&Cs VDBV operates it and owns the intellectual property rights to its content. Consequently, the provision of the website could not be part of the supply by VDL. VDL supplied the material or reviewed its content for VDBV pursuant to a contract between the two companies.

Decision

The FTT concluded that:

the quality, quantity, and nature of the optical information on the website was such that its provision could amount to medical care, but;
the information on the website is not provided by VDL (but by VDBV)
even if it were provided by VDL, the terms on which it is made available mean that it is not part of any supply made by VDL to customers and must be left out of account when it comes to characterising the supplies VDL does make
what VDL does do is choose the correct lenses and dispatch them. There is no element of medical care in VDL’s supply
there was little evidence as to how the opticians monitored the performance of the staff so that they could satisfy themselves that their performance was of a suitable standard, so it could not be said that there was direct supervision.

As a result, VDL did not provide medical care and in any case, the services were not wholly performed or directly supervised by appropriately qualified individuals so exemption could not apply

The appeal was dismissed.

Commentary

Opticians have long produced VAT challenges since the cases of Leightons and Eye-Tech in the 1990s. Any businesses using a similar business model are advised to review the treatment of their supplies in light of this case.

VAT: Powers of HMRC – The Impact Contracting Solutions Limited UT case

By Marcus Ward 5 September 2023

Latest from the courts

In the Impact Contracting Solutions Limited (ICS) Upper Tribunal (UT) case the issue was whether HMRC had the power to cancel the VAT registration where that person has facilitated the VAT fraud of another ie; the scope of the “Ablessio” principle. It also illustrates the impact of EU cases on UK courts.

Background

ICS’s customers were temporary work agencies, and its suppliers were approximately 3,000 mini-umbrella companies (“MUCs”) which supplied labour. HMRC decided to cancel ICS’s VAT registration number with reliance on the principle in the decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in Valsts ienemumu dienests v Ablessio SIA (C-527/11) (“Ablessio”). HMRC considered that ICS was registered for VAT principally or solely to abuse the VAT system by facilitating VAT fraud, and that, in such circumstances, they were empowered by the principle in Ablessio to cancel the registration. In particular, HMRC considered that the arrangements between ICSL and the MUCs were contrived, with the effect that the MUCs failed properly to account for VAT on their supplies to ICS.

ICS appealed against HMRC’s decision to cancel its registration.

The Issues

Does the principle in Ablessio apply only to a party that has itself fraudulently defaulted on its VAT obligations, or does it similarly apply to a party who has facilitated the VAT fraud of another party?

If the Ablessio principle does apply to a party who has facilitated the VAT fraud of another party, is simple facilitation sufficient, or must it additionally be proved that:

(a) the facilitating party was itself dishonest, or

(b) the facilitating party knew that it was facilitating the fraud, and/or

The First Tier Tribunal (FTT) decided that Ablessio applies both to a party that has fraudulently defaulted on its VAT obligations and to a party who has facilitated the VAT fraud of another party. Further that simple facilitation by a party of the VAT fraud of another is not sufficient to apply the Ablessio principle. However, it is not necessary to prove that the facilitating party was itself dishonest. It must, however, be proved that the facilitating party knew or should have known that it was facilitating the VAT fraud of another party.

Decision

The appeal was rejected an the FTT’s decision was upheld. HMRC powers are not contrary to UK VAT legislation.

The application by HMRC of Ablessio is not contra legem or otherwise prohibited by the VAT legislation where it is applied to deregister a taxpayer who has either fraudulently defaulted on its VAT obligations or facilitated the VAT fraud of another party and at the relevant time has also made taxable supplies unconnected with such fraud or facilitation of fraud and which would result in a liability to be registered.

Ablessio applies to the deregistration by HMRC of a person as well as to a refusal by HMRC to register a person. It also provides for the deregistration of a person who has facilitated the VAT fraud of another, where the person to be deregistered knew or should have known that it was facilitating the VAT fraud of another.

Commentary

This decision was released this month and illustrates the ongoing influence of EU legislation and cases, “despite” Brexit

EU legislation does not, by itself, fall within the scope of retained EU law (see below). However, domestic legislation implementing EU rules forms part of EU-derived domestic legislation and is preserved in domestic law.

The VAT Act 1994 is not affected by Brexit because it is an Act of Parliament and, therefore, remains effective unless it is changed by Parliament.

Overview of the impact of EU legislation

Post-Brexit, the UK could have decided that UK courts should not be bound by EU case law. However, this would have resulted in a situation where the UK courts effectively had to begin with a blank piece of paper in deciding how a piece of retained EU law should be interpreted or applied. This approach would have resulted in considerable uncertainty for business over how retained EU law would operate. In order avoid this, section 6 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 provides that:

CJEU judgments made on or before 31 December 2020 are binding on UK courts
CJEU judgments made after that date are not binding, but the UK courts are free to have regard to them, so far as they are relevant to the matter before the court.

Going forward

Helpful guidance is provided in the e-Accounting Solutions vs Global Infosys case (not a VAT case).

The Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Act 2023 means that the principle of EU-law conforming construction is a corollary of the supremacy of EU law (which is abolished under Section 3 of the Act) and will therefore no longer apply from 2024.

The principles of statutory construction under English Law require a purposive interpretation of legislation, whether or not EU law principles are engaged. This involves considering the context in which the legislation was made. Depending on the legislation concerned, this process may be guided by “external aids”. External aids referred to in the judgment include Explanatory Notes and Government White Papers, and could also presumably include references to Hansard where seen as appropriate by the courts. To the extent that domestic enactments were made for the purpose of implementing EU law, the EU law position is such an “external aid” and the UK law should be construed accordingly.

Where Parliament used the same language as the Directive, one may assume that it intended to mean the same – accordingly, the CJEU interpretation of Directive-terms informs the interpretation of the UK statute.

However, the statutory language remains paramount – “external aids”, to which EU law instruments are effectively downgraded in UK law from 2024, cannot displace unambiguous statutory language in UK enactments that is inconsistent with EU law.

VAT: Is a cosmetic treatment exempt medical care? The Illuminate Skin Clinics Ltd case

By Marcus Ward 12 July 2023

Latest from the courts

In the Illuminate Skin Clinics Ltd First-Tier Tribunal (FTT) case the issue was whether cosmetic procedures qualified as exempt medical treatment.

Background

The Appellant runs a private, ie; non-NHS clinic offering a range of aesthetic, skincare and wellness treatments advertised as: fat freezing, thread lifts, chemical peels, fillers, facials, intravenous drips and boosters. The Appellant’s sole director and shareholder, Dr Shotter, complies with Item 1 (below) in terms of qualifications, ie; she is enrolled on the register of medical professionals.

The list of treatments included:

Botox
Dermal fillers
CoolSculpting
Microsclerotherapy
Prescription skincare
Chemical peels
Microdermabrasion
Thread lifting
Thermavein
Aqualyx
Platelet-rich plasma treatment.

HMRC contended that these supplies were standard rated because there is no medical purpose behind the treatments, and they are carried out for purely cosmetic purposes. An assessment was raised for output tax on this income.

The Appellant argued that what it provided was exempt medical care via The VAT Act 1994, Schedule 9, Group 7, item 1 – “The supply of services consisting in the provision of medical care by a person registered or enrolled in any of the following:

The register of medical practitioners…”

And its contention was that the primary purpose of the treatments was “the protection, maintenance or restoration of the health of the person concerned”

In the Mainpay case it was established that “medical” care means “diagnosing, treating and, in so far as possible, curing diseases or health disorders”

Decision

Although there may have been a beneficial psychological impact on undergoing such treatments and this may have been the reason for a patient to proceed (and they may be recommended by qualified medical professionals) this, in itself, was insufficient to persuade the judge that the services were exempt. Consequety, the appeal was rejected and the assessment was upheld.

The FTT found that there was very little evidence of diagnosis. This was important to the overall analysis because diagnosis is the starting point of medical care. Without diagnosis, “treatment”, in the sense of the exemption, is not something which is being done responsively to a disease or a health disorder.

The fact that people go to the clinic feeling unhappy with some aspect of their appearance, and (at least sometimes) are happier when something is done at the clinic about that aspect of their appearance, does not mean that the treatment is medical, or has a therapeutic aim.

It was telling that the differentiation, in Dr Shotter’s own words, between what the clinic does from what “a GP or other health professional” does is; diagnosis. It also highlighted the general trend or purpose of the clinic’s activity – helping people to feel better about their appearance, in contexts where their appearance is not itself a health condition, or threatening to their health in a way which mandates treatment of their appearance by a GP or another health professional.

Helping someone to achieve goals in relation to their appearance, which is what this clinic did, is not treating someone’s mental health status, but is going to their self-esteem and self-confidence. It is a misuse of language to say that this is healthcare in the sense that it would fall within Item 1 of Group 7.

Commentary

There has been an ongoing debate as to what constitutes medical care. Over 20 years ago I was advising a large London clinic on this very point and much turned on whether patients’ mental health was improved by undergoing what many would regard as cosmetic procedures. We were somewhat handicapped in our arguments by the fact that many of the patients were lap dancers undergoing breast augmentation on the direction of the owner of the club…

It is worth remembering that not all services provided by a medically registered practitioner are exempt. The question of whether the medical care exemption is engaged in any given case will turn on the particular facts.

Further recent cases on medical exemption here and here.

VAT: Charity exemption for show admittance – The Yorkshire Agricultural Society case

By Marcus Ward 9 May 2023

Latest from the courts

In the Yorkshire Agricultural Society First Tier Tribunal (FTT) case the issue was whether payments for entry into the annual The Great Yorkshire Show qualified as exempt via The VAT Act 1994, Schedule 9, Group 12, item 1 –

“The supply of goods and services by a charity in connection with an event—

1. 1. that is organised for charitable purposes by a charity or jointly by more than one charity,
  2. whose primary purpose is the raising of money, and
  3. that is promoted as being primarily for the raising of money.”

HMRC raised an assessment on the grounds that the supply of admittance fell outwith the exemption so it was standard rated. It appears that this view was formed solely on the basis that the events were not advertised as fundraisers.

The exemption covers events whose primary purpose is the raising of money and which are promoted primarily for that purpose. HMRC contended that the events were not advertised as fundraisers and therefore the exemption did not apply. Not surprisingly, the appellant contended that all of the tests at Group 12 were fully met.

The FTT found difficulty in understanding HMRC’s argument. It was apparent from the relevant: tickets, posters and souvenir programmes all featured the words “The Great Yorkshire Show raises funds for the Yorkshire Agricultural Society to help support farming and the countryside”.

Decision

The FTT spent little time finding for the taxpayer and allowing the appeal. The assessment was withdrawn. There was a separate issue of the assessment being out of time, which was academic given the initial decision. However, The Tribunal was critical of HMRC’s approach to the time limit test (details in the linked decision). HMRC’s argument was that apparently, the taxpayer had brought the assessment on itself by not providing the information which HMRC wanted. The Judge commented: “That is not the same as HMRC being in possession of information which justified it in issuing the Assessment. It is an inversion of the statutory test”.

HMRC’s performance (or lack of it)

Apart from the clear outcome of this case, it also demonstrated how HMRC can get it so wrong. The FTT stated that it was striking that there was very little by way of substantive challenge by HMRC to the appellant’s evidence, nor any detailed exploration of it in cross-examination. The FTT, which is a fact-finding jurisdiction, asked a series of its own questions to establish some facts about the Society’s activities and the Show in better detail. No-one from HMRC filed a witness statement or gave evidence, even though HMRC, in its application to amend its Statement of Case, had said that the decision-maker would be giving evidence. The decision-maker did not give evidence. HMRC were wrong on the assessment and the time limit statutory test and did not cover itself in glory at the hearing.

Commentary

More evidence that if any business receives an assessment, it is always a good idea to get it reviewed. Time and time again we see HMRC make basic errors and misunderstand the VAT position. We have an excellent record on challenging HMRC decisions. Charities have a hard time of it with VAT, and while it is accurate to say that some of the legislation and interpretation is often complex for NFPs, HMRC do not help by taking such ridiculous cases.

VAT: Are Turmeric shots zero rated food? The Innate-Essence Limited case

By Marcus Ward 5 May 2023

Latest from the courts

In the Innate-Essence Limited (t/a The Turmeric Co) First Tier tribunal (FTT) case the issue was whether turmeric shots were zero rated food via The VAT Act 1994, Schedule 8, Group 1, general item 1 or a standard rated beverage per item 4 of the Excepted items.

The Legislation

“General items Item No 1 Food of a kind used for human consumption. …

Excepted Items Item No … 4 Other beverages (including fruit juices and bottled waters) and syrups, concentrates, essences, powders, crystals or other products for the preparation of beverages.”

The Product

Turmeric roots are crushed and the pulp sieved to extract the liquid. No additional liquids such as apple juice, orange juice or water are added during the production process.

The Shots contain:

small quantities of crushed, whole fresh watermelon and lemons which act as a base and provides a natural preservative effect
fresh pineapple juice
flax oil and black pepper

All the ingredients are cold pressed to retain the maximum nutritional value of the raw ingredients. The Shots are not pasteurised as this would negatively affect the nutritional content of the Shots. No sugar or sweeteners are added to the Shots. The Shots are sold in small 60ml plastic bottles and it was stated that they provided long term health benefits.

The court applied the many tests derived from case law on similar products, and as is usual in these types of cases, the essence of the decision was on whether the Exception for beverages applied to The Shots.

Whether a product is a beverage (standard rated) is typically based on tests established in the Bioconcepts case (via VFOOD7520) as there is no definition of “beverage” in the legislation. The tests:

it must be a drinkable liquid that is commonly consumed
it must be characteristically taken to increase bodily liquid levels, or
taken to slake the thirst, or
consumed to fortify, or
consumed to give pleasure

The principle of the tests is based on the idea that a drinkable liquid is not automatically a beverage, but could be a liquid food that is not a beverage.

The Tribunal found that the Shots were not beverages but zero rated food items. As The judge put it: “In our view, the marketing and customer reviews demonstrate clear consistency in the use to which the Shots are put. The Shots are consumed in one go on a regular, long-term basis for the sole purpose of the claimed health and wellbeing benefits. The purpose of the Shots is entirely functional: to maximise the consumers daily ingestion of curcumin which is achieved by cold pressing the raw ingredients into a liquid. We consider it highly unlikely that a consumer would attempt to ingest the same quantity of raw turmeric in solid form.

The Shots are marketed on the basis of the nutritional content of the high-quality ingredients (primarily raw turmeric) that are stated to support health and wellbeing. The Shots contain black pepper and flax oil, two ingredients that are not commonly found in beverages. The Shots are marketed as requiring regular daily consumption over a long period of time (at least three months) to provide the consumer with the claimed long-term health and wellbeing benefits. A one-off purchase of a Shot would not achieve the stated benefits of drinking a Shot”.

The Tribunal also went to consider the “lunch time pints in pubs” (The Kalron case) issue, but I would rather not comment on whether this is a usual substitute for a lunch…

The appeal was allowed.

Commentary

Yet another food/beverage case. Case law insists that each product must be considered in significant detail to correctly identify the VAT liability and even then, a dispute with HMRC may not be avoided. Very small differences in content, marketing, processes etc can affect the VAT treatment. As new products hit the shop shelves at an increasing rate I suspect that we will be treated to many more such cases in the future. If your business produces or sells similar products, it will be worth considering whether this case assists in any contention for zero rating.

VAT: TOGC and deliberate errors – The Apollinaire case

By Marcus Ward 19 December 2022

Latest from the courts

In the First -Tier Tribunal (FTT) case of Apollinaire Ltd and Mr Z H Hashmi the issues were:

whether the appellant’s input tax claim was valid
were the director’s actions “deliberate”
was a Personal Liability Notice (PLN) appropriate?

Background

Mr Hashmi (the sole director of Apollinaire) asserted that he sold his business, Snow Whyte Limited to a Mr Singh as a going concern, together with the trading name “Benny Hamish”. The purchase price was never paid. He alleged that Mr Singh traded for approximately one month and then sold stock worth £573,756 to Apollinaire. The appellant submitted an input tax claim for the purchase of the goods. HMRC refused to make the repayment and raised penalties for deliberate errors. HMRC subsequently issued a PLN to Mr Hashmi.

Issues

Initially HMRC stated that Mr Singh may not have existed, that there was no sale of Snow Whyte Ltd by Mr Hashmi to Mr Singh and similarly, no sale back to Mr Hashmi. However, this submission was later amended to argue that Mr Hashmi controlled the movement of the stock at all times and that the issue was whether the transfer of stock from Snow Whyte Limited was a Transfer Of a Going Concern (TOGC), whether or not Mr Singh existed.

Mr Hashmi appealed, contending that the transactions took place as described to HMRC.

Decision

Unsurprisingly, given Mr Hashmi’s previous history of dissolving companies, but continuing to trade under the same name as those companies (listed at para 14 of the decision) and failing to submit returns and payments, the FTT accepted HMRC’s version of events. Further, there was insufficient evidence to support the transactions (if they took place) and the judge fund that the appellant’s evidence was not credible. If the events did take place, there was no input tax to claim as all the tests (where relevant here) for a TOGC (Value Added Tax (Special Provisions) Order 1995, Regulation 5) were met:

the assets were sold as a business as a going concern
the assets were used by the transferee in carrying on the same kind of business
there was no break in trading
both entities traded under the same name
both entities operated from the same premises
both entities had the same employees and tills

The appeal was dismissed.

Penalties

The FTT further decided that HMRC’s penalties and PLN [Finance Act 2007, Schedule 24, 19(1)] were appropriate. The claim for input tax was deliberately overstated and that Mr Hashmi was the controlling mind of both entities and was personally liable as the sole company director of Apollinaire.

HMRC relied on case law: Clynes v Revenue and Customs[2016] UKFTT 369 (TC) which reads as follows:

“On its normal meaning, the use of the term indicates that for there to be a deliberate inaccuracy on a person’s part, the person must have acted consciously, with full intention or set purpose or in a considered way…

…Our view is that, depending on the circumstances, an inaccuracy may also be held to be deliberate where it is found that the person consciously or intentionally chose not to find out the correct position, in particular, where the circumstances are such that the person knew he should do so.”

Commentary

This case is a reverse of the usual TOGC disputes as HMRC sought to establish that there was no taxable supply so no VAT was due. It underlines that:

care should always be taken with applying TOGC treatment (or appreciating the results of failing to recognise a TOGC)
penalties for deliberate errors can be significant and swingeing
directors can, and are, held personally responsible for actions taken by a company