Tag Archives: FTT

VAT: Tribunal costs

By   23 April 2025

    Latest from the courts

    In the First Tier Tribunal (FTT) case of Eurolaser IT Ltd regarding Kittel and Mecsek assessments and penalties:

    • whether an agent knew or should have known of fraud in supply chain – yes
    • whether such knowledge/means of knowledge to be attributed to Appellant – yes
    • whether Mecsek requires HMRC to show reasonable steps not taken by Appellant – yes
    • whether reasonable steps taken – no
    • unsurprisingly, the appeal was refused

    one interesting aspect was the award of costs.

    Generally, in FTT cases the rule is that each party will usually bear its own costs.

    However, it is worth recapping how the award of costs works via The Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. In this instant case, the Appellant had not ‘opted out’ of the costs protection regime set out in rule 10(c)(ii) of the Rules. Consequently, the FTT ordered that Eurolaser must pay HMRC’s costs – a sting in the tail. So, what are the rules? (Where relevant here)

    Orders for costs

    “10.—(1) The Tribunal may only make an order in respect of costs (or, in Scotland, expenses)—

    (a) under section 29(4) of the 2007 Act (wasted costs) [and costs incurred in applying for such costs];

    (b) if the Tribunal considers that a party or their representative has acted unreasonably in bringing, defending or conducting the proceedings; 

    (c) if—

    (i) the proceedings have been allocated as a Complex case under rule 23 (allocation of cases to categories); and

    (ii) the taxpayer (or, where more than one party is a taxpayer, one of them) has not sent or delivered a written request to the Tribunal, within 28 days of receiving notice that the case had been allocated as a Complex case, that the proceedings be excluded from potential liability for costs or expenses under this sub-paragraph”

    So, in “Complex” cases, an Appellant must submit a request that the case is excluded from the potential liability of costs being awarded, and HMRC must request repayment of its costs incurred in defending the case.

    What are Complex cases?

    These are complicated cases which:

    • require lengthy or complex evidence
    • require a lengthy hearing
    • involve complex or important principles or issues
    • involve large amounts or tax or penalties

    such cases are allocated to a ‘track’ within the FTT system.

    Other cost awards

    It is also worth remembering that costs can be awarded if the appeal is brought unreasonably. This usually means that it is vexatious or frivolous, so proper advice should be sought when considering an appeal.

    VAT Success Stories

    By   22 April 2025
    I often write about how it is important to seek VAT advice at the right time, see triggerpoints. So, I thought that I’d give some practical examples on where we have saved our clients money, time and aggravation.

    Investment company

    HMRC denied claims for input tax incurred on costs relating to the potential acquisition of an overseas business and threatened to deregister the plc as it was not, currently, making taxable supplies. Additionally, HMRC contended that even if VAT registration was appropriate, the input tax incurred did not relate to taxable supplies and was therefore blocked.

    We were able to persuade HMRC that our client had a right to be VAT registered because it intended to make taxable supplies (supplies with a place of supply outside the UK which would have been taxable if made in the UK) and that the input tax was recoverable as it related to these intended taxable supplies (management charges to the acquired business). This is a hot topic at the moment, but we were able to eventually demonstrate, with considerable and detailed evidence that there was a true intention.

    This meant that UK VAT registration was correct and input tax running into hundreds of thousands of pounds incurred in the UK was repaid to our client.

    Restaurant

    We identified and submitted a claim for a West End restaurant for nearly £300,000 overpaid output tax. We finally agreed the repayment with HMRC after dealing with issues such as the quantum of the claim and unjust enrichment.

    Developer

    Our property developing client specialises in very high-end residential projects in exclusive parts of London. They built a dwelling using an existing façade and part of a side elevation. We contended that it was a new build (zero rated sale and no VAT on construction costs and full input tax recovery on other costs). HMRC took the view that it was work on an existing dwelling so that 5% applied and input tax was not recoverable. After site visits, detailed plans, current and historical photograph evidence HMRC accepted the holy grail of new build. The overall cost of the project was tens of millions.

    Charity

    A charity client was supplying services to the NHS. The issue was whether they were standard rated supplies of staff or exempt medical services. We argued successfully that, despite previous rulings, the supplies were exempt, which benefited all parties. Our client was able to deregister from VAT, but not only that, we persuaded HMRC that input tax previously claimed could be kept. This was a rather pleasant surprise outcome.  We also avoided any penalties and interest so that VAT did not represent a cost to the charity in any way.  If the VAT was required to be repaid to HMRC it is likely that the charity would have been wound up.

    Shoot

    A group of friends met to shoot game as a hobby. They made financial contributions to the syndicate in order to take part. HMRC considered that this was a business activity and threatened to go back over 40 years and assess for output tax on the syndicate’s takings which amounted to many hundreds of thousands of pounds and would have meant the shoot could not continue. We appealed the decision to retrospectively register the syndicate.

    After a four-year battle HMRC settled on the steps of the Tribunal. We were able to demonstrate that the syndicate was run on a cost sharing basis and is not “an activity likely to be carried out by a private undertaking on a market, organised within a professional framework and generally performed in the interest of generating a profit.” – A happy client.

    Chemist

    We assisted a chemist client who, for unfortunate reasons, had not been able to submit proper VAT returns for a number of years.  We were able to reconstruct the VAT records which showed a repayment of circa £500,000 of VAT was due.  We successfully negotiated with HMRC and assisted with the inspection which was generated by the claim.

    The message? Never accept a HMRC decision, and seek good advice!

    VAT: Are hair transplants ‘medical care’? – The Advanced Hair Technology Ltd case

    By   12 March 2025

    Latest from the courts

    In the Advanced Hair Technology Ltd First-Tier Tribunal (FTT) case the issue was whether hair transplants are exempt supplies of medical care, or were they for ‘cosmetic’ purposes and consequently standard rated?

    Background

    Advanced Hair Technology Ltd (AHT) was a  medical practice trading as The Farjo Hair Institute which specialised in hair restoration surgery. It treated conditions related to hair loss, in particular androgenetic alopecia (AGA). Dr Farjo who carried out the work is qualified is a medical practitioner with the Royal College of Surgeons. The output tax which HMRC deemed due was circa £2,500,000.

    The sole issue was what AHT provided covered by the definition ‘medical care’?

    Legislation

    The VAT Act 1994, Schedule 9, Group 7, item 1 covers services which are for the primary purpose of protecting, restoring, or maintaining health: “medical care”.                                                                 

    Contentions

    AHT argued that it was treating patients for medical conditions, as opposed to providing aesthetic surgery and consequently, its supplies were exempt. The appellant explained that several patients believed that hair loss had affected their self-confidence and so the surgery improved their overall health (which includes a mental health element). Furthermore, the surgery helps to protect the skin from future photodamage, minor trauma and thermal insult.

    HMRC contended that none of the patients had any recorded prior psychiatric conditions, eg; depression or anxiety, nor had any stated that they were looking to benefit from the surgery beyond it improving their appearance and confidence. Additionally,  no recipients of the treatment said that they were seeking any of the above physical protections.

    Therefore, the treatment was a standard rated cosmetic procedure.

    Decision

    The meaning of ‘medical care’ was considered by the Court of Appeal in its decision in Mercy Global [2023] EWCA Civ 1073.

    The court agreed with HMRC that a “principal purpose” test must be applied in all cases.

    The evidence before the FTT was that by the age of 70 at least 80% of caucasian men suffer from hair loss as a result of AGA, and this is part of the normal process of aging. AGA is not considered a medical condition but rather a symptom.

    AHT’s contention that the procedures serve a therapeutic purpose related to psychological issues was dismissed due to a lack of evidence from qualified practitioners. This reinforced the FTT’s view that the treatments were primarily cosmetic, rather than for medical reasons because altering one’s physical appearance was for aesthetic purposes.

    The relevant supplies were therefore outside the exemption.

    The appeal was dismissed.

    Commentary

    The judgment provides some guidance on the interpretation of the definition of medical care for the purposes of the exemption and follows similar recent cases which we covered here:

    Skin Science

    Skin Rich

    X

    The concept of the “provision of medical care” does not include medical interventions carried out for a purpose other than that of diagnosing, treating and in so far as possible, curing diseases or health disorders and it is the purpose of the medical intervention rather than merely the qualifications of the person providing it that is key in determining the VAT liability.

    There has been an ongoing debate as to what constitutes medical care. Over 20 years ago I was advising a large London clinic on this very point and much turned on whether patients’ mental health was improved by undergoing what many would regard as cosmetic procedures. We were somewhat handicapped in our arguments by the fact that many of the patients were lap dancers undergoing breast augmentation on the direction of the owner of a certain club…

    It is worth remembering that not all services provided by a medically registered practitioner are exempt. The question of whether the medical care exemption is engaged in any given case will turn on the particular facts .

    Interestingly, the judge here stated that the medical exemption may apply to some patients whose hair loss was a result of trauma caused by cancer treatment.

    VAT penalties and surcharges – time limits for appeals. The Excel case

    By   10 February 2025

    Latest from the courts

    The recent Xcel Consult Limited First-Tier Tribunal (FTT) case serves as a reminder on the tight time limits for appealing against VAT penalties and surcharges.

    The VAT Act 1994 Section 83G sets out a statutory time limit for bringing appeals in respect of VAT penalties and surcharges of the kind in question in this case. An appeal is to be made to the tribunal before the end of the period of 30 days beginning with the date of the document notifying the decision to which the appeal relates.

    Section 83G(6) provides that an appeal may be made after the expiry of the statutory period if the Tribunal gives permission. In deciding whether to give permission to allow the late appeal, the three-stage test set out in Maitland is applied. These tests are:

    (1) establish the length of the delay and whether it is serious and/or significant

    (2) establish the reason or reasons why the delay occurred

    (3) evaluate all the circumstances of the case, using a balancing exercise to assess the merits of the reason(s) given for the delay and the prejudice which would be caused to both parties by granting or refusing permission, and in doing so take into account “the particular importance of the need for litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost, and for statutory time limits to be respected”.

    Commentary

    Our advice is to always respond within the 30 day limit, as relying on an out of time appeal can be risky. If that is not possible, an appeal should be submitted asap to ensure that test 1) above is not a reason to reject a submission.

    VAT: Supply of self-contained apartments covered by TOMS? The Sonder UT case

    By   21 January 2025

    Latest from the courts

    In the Upper Tribunal (UT) case of Sonder Europe Limited (Sonder) the issue was whether apartments leased to Sonder and used to provide short-term accommodation to corporate and leisure travellers were supplies of a designated travel service via the Tour Operators’ Margin Scheme (TOMS) and whether the bought-in supply was used for the direct benefit of travellers (as required by TOMS).

    Background

    Sonder leased apartments from landlords on a medium to long-term basis and used them to provide accommodation to travellers on a short-term basis (one night to a month; the average stay being five nights). Sonder furnished some apartments as well as undertaking occasional decorating and maintenance.

    The sole issue was whether these supplies are covered by TOMS. TOMS is not optional.

    Initially in the FTT it was decided that output tax was due via TOMS. This was an appeal by HMRC against that First Tier Tribunal (FTT) decision.

    The issue

    Whether VAT was accountable using TOMS – on the margin, or on the full amount received from travellers by Sonder.

    Legislation

    TOMS is authorised by the VAT Act 1994, section 53 and via SI 1987/1806.

    Arguments

    Sonder contended that the supply was “for the direct benefit of the traveller” as required by the VAT (Tour Operators) Order 1987 and that the accommodation was provided “…without material alteration or further processing”. Consequently, TOMS applied. The FTT decided that Sonder did not materially alter or process the apartments.

    HMRC maintained that the FTT decision was based on the physical alternations made rather than the actual characteristics of the supplies. Consequently, these were not supplies covered by the 1987 Order and output tax was due on the total income received for these services.

     Decision

    The UT upheld HMRC’s appeal and decided that TOMS did not apply n these circumstances The UT found that the FTT’s decision was in error in that it did not have regard to whether the services bought in were supplied to it for the direct benefit of travellers. Furthermore, the short-term leases to occupy property as holiday accommodation were materially altered from interests in land for a period of years supplied by the landlords.

    The services received by Sonder from the landlords were not for the direct benefit of the travellers and Sonder’s supplies were not for the benefit of the users without material alteration and further processing. Consequently, there was not a supply of bought-in services, but rather an ‘in-house’ supply which was not covered by TOMS.

    To the UT, the position was even clearer in relation to unfurnished apartments. Sonder acquired an interest in land for a term of years in an unfurnished apartment. It furnished the apartment and then supplied a short-term licence to a traveller to occupy as holiday accommodation. What was supplied to the traveller was materially different to what was supplied to Sonder.

    Commentary

     Another illustration of the complexities of TOMS and the significant impact on a business of getting the rules wrong. The fact that the UT remade the decision demonstrates that different interpretations are possible on similar facts. Moreover, even slight differences in business models can result in different VAT outcomes.

    VAT: Zero-rated exports. The Procurement International case

    By   7 November 2024

    Latest from the courts

    In the First-Tier Tribunal (FTT) case of Procurement International Ltd (PIL) the issue was whether the movement of goods constituted a zero-rated export.

    Background

    Both parties essentially agreed the facts: The Appellant’s business is that of a reward recognition programme fulfiller. The Appellant had a catalogue of available products, and it maintained a stock of the most ordered items in its warehouse. PIL supplied these goods to customers who run reward recognition programmes on behalf of their customers who, in turn, want to reward to their customers and/or employees (reward recipients – RR). The reward programme operators (RPOs) provide a platform through which those entitled to receive rewards can such rewards. The RPO will then place orders PIL for the goods.

    A shipper collected the goods from PIL in the UK and shipped them directly to the RR (wherever located). The shipper provided the services of delivery including relevant customs clearances etc. on behalf of the Appellant. PIL had zero-rated the supply of goods sent to RRs located overseas. All goods delivered to RRs outside the UK are delivered duty paid (DDP) or delivered at place (DAP). As may be seen by Incoterms the Appellant remained at risk in respect of the goods and liable for all carriage costs and is responsible for performing or contracting for the performance of all customs (export and import) obligations. The Appellant was responsible for all fees, duties, tariffs, and taxes. Accordingly, the Appellant is responsible for, and at risk until, the goods are delivered “by placing them at the disposal of the buyer at the agreed point, if any, or at the named place of destination or by procuring that the goods are so delivered”.

    Contentions

    HMRC argued that in situations where the RPO was UK VAT registered, the appellant was making a supply of goods to the RPO at a time when the goods were physically located in the UK, and consequently there was a standard-rated supply. It issued an assessment to recover the output tax considered to be underdeclared.

    PIL contended that there was a supply of delivered goods which were zero-rated when the goods were removed to a location outside the UK. It was responsible (via contracts which were accepted to reflect the reality of the transactions) for arranging the transport of the goods.

    Decision

    The FTT held that there was a single composite supplies of delivered goods, and these were a zero-rated supply of exported goods by PIL. The supplies were not made on terms that the RPOs collected or arranged for collection of the goods to remove them from the UK. The Tribunal found that the RPOs took title to the goods at the time they were delivered to the RR, and not before such that it was PIL and not the RPOs who was the exporter. This meant that the RPOs would be regarded as making their supplies outside the UK and would be responsible for overseas VAT as the Place Of Supply (POS) would be in the country in which it took title to the goods (but that was not an issue in this case).

    The appeal was allowed, and the assessment was withdrawn.

    Legislation

    Domestic legislation relevant here is The VAT Act 1994:

    • Section 6(2) which fixes the time of supply of goods involving removal as the time they are removed
    • Section 7 VATA sets out the basis on which the place of supply is determined. Section 7(2) states that: “if the supply of any goods does not involve their removal from or to the United Kingdom they shall be treated as supplied in the United Kingdom if they are in the United Kingdom and otherwise shall be treated as supplied outside the United Kingdom”.
    • Section 30(6) VATA provides that a supply of goods is zero-rated where such supply is made in the UK and HMRC are satisfied that the person supplying the goods has exported them
    • For completeness, VAT Regulations 1995, regulation 129 provides the framework for the zero-rating goods removed from the UK by and on behalf of the purchaser of the goods.

    Some paragraphs of VAT Notice 703 have the force of law which applies here, namely the sections on:

    • direct and indirect exports
    • conditions which must be met in full for goods to be zero-rated as exports
    • definition of an exporter
    • the appointment of a freight forwarder or other party to manage the export transactions and declarations on behalf of the supplier of exporter.
    • the conditions and time limits for zero rating
    • a situation in which there are multiple transactions leading to one movement of goods

    Commentary

    The Incoterms set out in the relevant contracts were vital in demonstrating the responsibilities of the parties and consequently, who actually exported the goods. It is crucial when analysing the VAT treatment of transactions to recognise each party’s responsibilities, and importantly, when (and therefore where) the change in possession of the goods takes place.

    VAT: Second-hand goods scheme and best judgement – The Ancient & Modern Jewellers Limited case

    By   7 October 2024

    Latest from the courts

    The second-hands of time.

    In the First-tier Tribunal (FTT) case, the issue was whether the second-hand goods margin scheme (margin scheme) was applicable and whether HMRC’s assessments for £5,474,249 (later reduced to £5,004,595) of underdeclared of output tax were issued in best judgement.

    Background

    The Ancient & Modern Jewellers Limited (A&M) sold second-hand wristwatches with the majority of the sales properly accounted for via the margin scheme. However, from information obtained from Italian tax authorities in respect of supply chain fraud, HMRC issued the assessments on the basis that supplies of certain goods did not meet the conditions of the margin scheme so that output tax was due on the full value of the watches rather than the difference between the purchase and sale values. HMRC decided to penalise A&M because the errors were deliberate and prompted and subsequently to issue a PLN on the basis that such conduct was attributable to the director. A&M is a “High Value Dealer” for anti-money laundering purposes.

    Contentions

    Appellant

    The appellant claimed that HMRC did not use best judgement on the grounds that:

    • the inspector did not impartially consider the evidence
    • HMRC lacked sufficient evidence to raise an assessment thereby failing to meet the Van Boeckel test
    • the calculated amounts were no more than unreasonable and random guesses
    • the inspector did not approach the investigation with an open mind to such an extent that it could not be said that the assessments and penalties were the product of the reasonable behaviours of HMRC
    • put in terms of the case law: HMRC had acted in a way which no reasonable body of commissioners could have acted or, put another way, had been vindictive, dishonest or capricious

    so the assessments and penalties were invalid.

    Whilst accepting that a best judgment challenge is a high bar A&M contended that the conduct and mindset of HMRC’s investigating and assessing officer was so unreasonable that it vitiated the whole assessment.

    Respondent

    HMRC contended that the assessments were based on best judgement and that its focus was not on the supply chain fraud claims (as claimed by A&M). Additionally, a previous inspection in 2014 had raised prior concerns which provided adequate grounds for the assessments. Moreover, A&M was aware of the terms of operation of the second-hand margin scheme and considered that A&M had wilfully misused the scheme in several regards. The scheme had been incorrectly used for goods purchased by way of intracommunity supplies – which had been imported with the appellant claiming input tax on the imports and then including them in the margin scheme. A&M wilfully failed to carry out due diligence on its suppliers.

    Best Judgement

    It may be helpful if we consider what the words “best judgement” mean. This was best described by Woolf J in Van Boeckel v CEC [1981] STC 290

    “What the words ‘best of their judgement’ envisage, in my view, is that the commissioners will fairly consider all material before them and, on that material, come to a decision which is one which is reasonable and not arbitrary as to the amount of tax which is due. As long as there is some material on which the commissioners can reasonably act, then they are not required to carry out investigations which may or may not result in further material being placed before them.”

    Technical

    The second-hand margin scheme is provided for under The VAT Act 1994, Section 50A, The Value Added Tax (Special Provisions) Order 1995 and certain paragraphs of VAT Notice 718 which have force of law.

    Decision

    The appeal was dismissed. It was found that A&M deliberately rendered inaccurate VAT returns. The director of the company was aware both of how the margin scheme worked and that the terms of the scheme had to be complied with if a supply was to be taxed under the it. A&M was found to have acted deliberately in misusing the scheme by including ineligible supplies. A&M had been lax in the completion of its stock book, and it had not met the record-keeping requirements necessary to use the scheme for the relevant transactions. Additionally, some of its EU suppliers were not registered for VAT, a fact A&M did not take steps to discover, and so related purchases could not qualify for the scheme. Also, it was likely that some of the purchases were of new watches which made them ineligible for the margin scheme.

    Re, evidence; the FTT found much of the A&M director’s evidence to have been self-serving and, in parts, evasive and that it did not consider that the integrity of HMRC could be impugned. The court determined that; the inspector was diligent and thorough, HMRC had legitimate concerns regarding A&M’s use of the margin scheme generally and specifically and there was a wider concern that the company was a participant in fraudulent supply chains. The FTT considered that the investigation was proportionately carried out considering these concerns and the assessments raised in exercise of best judgment.

    Penalties and PLN

    The case further considered penalties: whether the appellant’s conduct was deliberate (yes – appeal dismissed). Whether the Personal Liability Notice (PLN) [Finance Act 2007, Schedule 24, 19(1)] was appropriate for the conduct attributed to the director – whether his conduct led to penalty (yes – appeal dismissed).

    Commentary

    This case is a long read, but worthwhile for comments on; the margin scheme use, HMRC’s inspection methods, best judgement, evidence and MTIC amongst other matters.

    VAT: More on separate and single supplies. The KFC dip pot case

    By   10 June 2024

    Latest from the courts

    In the First-Tier tribunal case of Queenscourt Limited the issue was whether dip pots supplied as part of a takeaway meal deal are a separate zero-rated supply (of cold food) or whether they are part of a single VATable supply of hot food.

    Background

    The appellant had originally accounted for output tax on the basis that dip pots formed part of a single standard rated supply with other food. However, following advice, it then formed the view that zero-rating applied to these pots and submitted a claim for overpaid output tax. HMRC agreed to repay the VAT claimed.

    Subsequently, a further claim as made on a similar basis for a later period. This was considered by a different officer who refused to make the repayment on the basis that there was no separate supply of the dip pots. This called into question whether the payment of the initial claim was correct. The officer considered the previous repayment to have been incorrect and issued assessments in order to recover the amount which had been repaid.

    Queenscourt now appealed both against the decision to refuse the repayment claimed in the second error correction notice and also against the recovery assessment relating to the first error correction notice.  Moreover, the recovery assessments are invalid as there has been no change in circumstances and no new facts have come to light since HMRC agreed to repay the tax. Alternatively, it argues that HMRC are prevented from recovering the tax, either on the basis of legitimate expectation or estoppel by convention, in each case arising as a result of HMRC’s original agreement that that tax should be repaid.

    Decision

    The appeal was dismissed.

    • On the dip point issue, the FTT stated that it was unlikely the dip would be eaten on its own, or as an end in itself, unlike the coleslaw or cookie elements – It is a means of better enjoying the hot food. Consequently, it is an element of a standard rated single composite supply of hot takeaway food.
    • Legitimate expectation – Whilst the Tribunal did have jurisdiction to consider arguments based on legitimate expectation in the context of an appeal against a recovery assessment, it is not in this case sufficiently unfair for HMRC to resile from their initial acceptance of the claim made in the first error correction notice and to apply the correct tax treatment.
    • Estoppel – HMRC is not estopped from making or relying on their recovery assessments as there has been no detrimental reliance on the original position taken by HMRC in connection with any subsequent mutual dealings.

    Commentary

    It is difficult to see the end of single/multiple supply cases, as my previous articles consider:

    Here, here, here, here, and how to categorise a supply here.

    VAT: Are cosmetic skin treatments exempt medical care? The Skin Science case

    By   8 May 2024

    Latest from the courts

    In the First Tier Tribunal (FTT) case of Gillian Graham T/A Skin Science the issue was whether certain cosmetic skin treatments were exempt via The VAT Act 1994, Schedule 9, Group 7, item 1 which covers services for the primary purpose of protecting, restoring or maintaining health: “medical care”                                                                  

    Were the services provided by Skin Science (SS) medical care?

    Background

    SS ran a clinic at 10 Harley Street, London and Ms Graham was a Registered General Nurse (RGN).

    As an RGN the Appellant must submit revalidation every three years to the Nursing & Midwifery Council. The revalidation process requires her to demonstrate evidence of the scope of her professional practice including; evidence of hours worked, case studies, discussions with other medical professionals to obtain feedback and attending training courses. The Appellant’s realm of practice is disorders of the skin.

    Patients generally attend the Appellant’s clinic by choice and are not referred to the Appellant by a doctor or psychologist. Some clients might see the Appellant following referrals from beauticians who may be unable to carry out treatments for certain conditions.

    The treatments that the Appellant provides to her patients are not generally part of a treatment plan which involves other health professionals. SS could not confirm whether psychiatrists, psychological professionals or doctors would prescribe fillers or toxin for the conditions that she diagnoses.

    A range of treatments were provided, including:

    • Restylane
    • Pix Cannula
    • Teosyal light filling
    • Muscle relaxing injections
    • Dermal roller
    • Glycolic Acid Peel
    • TCA Peel
    • Botox
    • Belotero Volume
    • Dermal fillers
    • Face lift by injection
    • Hollywood Eye Magic Serum
    • Belotero injections

    SS provided a description of each treatment to the Tribunal.

    The appellant also prescribed medicines such as; Lidocaine, Botulinum, Scleremo, Zinerate and Tretinoin.

    Contentions

    SS argued that the supplies of skin care treatments are exempt from VAT as they are supplies of medical care. She diagnoses recognised medical conditions, provides treatment to address those conditions and is fully qualified to do so. As all of her treatments are aimed at treating or curing those recognised medical conditions, they inevitably have a therapeutic purpose. Although they may improve the appearance of the patients and in some cases be regarded as inherently cosmetic, this is consequential as the primary purpose is to address an underlying medical condition whether physical or psychological or both. Moreover, purpose should be determined by a medical professional and not by HMRC.

    HMRC contended that these supplies were standard rated (causing SS to become VAT registered) as they did not have the primary purpose of protecting, restoring or maintaining health as they were overwhelmingly cosmetic and so do not satisfy the requirements of the exemption.

    Decision

    It was noted that the concept of the “provision of medical care” does not include medical interventions carried out for a purpose other than that of diagnosing, treating and in so far as possible, curing diseases or health disorders and it is the purpose of the medical intervention rather than merely the qualifications of the person providing it that is key.

    Health problems may be psychological, they are not limited to physical problems. Where treatment is for purely cosmetic reasons it cannot be within the exemption. Where, however, the purpose of the treatment is to treat or provide care for persons who as a result of illness, injury or a congenital physical impairment are in need of plastic surgery or other cosmetic treatment then this may fall within the concept of medical care.

    The Appellant is not a psychological professional under Item 1(c) of Group 7 (health professionals) or a psychiatrist under Item 1(a) (medical practitioners), so the focus must be on what is within the scope of an RGN’s profession. The judge found that the Appellant had not proven her case that diagnosing and treating conditions which are psychological is within the scope of her profession as an RGN.

    The decision was that the treatments were not for the primary purpose of protecting, restoring or maintaining health and so not “medical care” and consequently the appeal was dismissed.

    A parallel outcome to a similar case in the Skin Clinics Ltd case. Other cases on medical exemption here, here and here.

    Commentary

    There has been an ongoing debate as to what constitutes medical care. Over 20 years ago I was advising a large London clinic on this very point and much turned on whether patients’ mental health was improved by undergoing what many would regard as cosmetic procedures. We were somewhat handicapped in our arguments by the fact that many of the patients were lap dancers undergoing breast augmentation on the direction of the owner of the club…

    It is crucial to apply the above tests to any medical services to determine whether they come within the exemption.

    It is worth remembering that not all services provided by a medically registered practitioner are exempt. The question of whether the medical care exemption is engaged in any given case will turn on the particular facts.

    Tax points and VAT groups – The Prudential Assurance Company Ltd CoA case

    By   11 April 2024

    Latest from the courts

    In the The Prudential Assurance Company Limited (Pru) Court of Appeal (CoA) case the issues were the “difficult” questions in respect of the relationship between the VAT grouping rules and the time of supply (tax point) legislation. Is VAT is applicable on a continuous supply of services where these services were supplied while the companies were VAT grouped, but invoices were issued after the supplier left the VAT group?

    Background

    Pru was at the relevant time carrying on with-profits life and insurance business. Silverfleet Capital Limited (Silverfleet) provided Pru with investment management services. Under an agreement dated 30 August 2002, the consideration which Silverfleet received for its services comprised a management fee calculated by reference to the amount of investments made during the period in which services were provided and performance fees, payable in the event that the performance of certain funds exceeded a set benchmark rate of return.

    When Silverfleet was rendering its investment management services, Pru was the representative member of a VAT group of which Silverfleet was also a member. However, in 2007 a management buy-out was effected, as a result of which Silverfleet ceased to be a member of Pru’s VAT group. It also ceased to provide management services to Pru.

    During 2014 and 2015, the hurdle rate set under the 2002 agreement was passed. Silverfleet accordingly invoiced Prudential at various dates between 2015 and 2016 for fees totalling £9,330,805.92 (“the Performance Fees”) plus VAT at 20%.

    The Issues

    The CoA considered whether the Performance Fees are subject to VAT.

    The First-tier Tribunal (FTT) decided the point in favour of Pru. However, HMRC succeeded in an appeal to the Upper Tribunal (UT). In a decision that decision, the UT concluded that VAT was chargeable on the Performance Fees.

    In its decision, the FTT queried whether regulation 90 of the VAT Regulations went so far as to direct that Silverfleet’s services had not been provided within a VAT group and had been “supplied in the course or furtherance of a business that in the VAT group world was not being carried on”. Further, the FTT was “unable to see what feature distinguishes [Prudential’s] case from that of the taxpayer in [B J Rice & Associates v Customs and Excise Commissioners]”.

    In contrast, the UT considered that, pursuant to regulation 90 of the VAT Regulations, Silverfleet’s services were to be treated as having been supplied when invoiced and, hence, at a time when Silverfleet and Prudential were no longer members of the same VAT group. That being so, section 43 of VATA 1994 was not, in the UT’s view, in point. The UT also considered that the FTT had erred in regarding itself as bound by B J Rice & Associates v Customs and Excise Commissioners [1996] STC 581 (“B J Rice”) to allow the appeal. Unlike Mr Rice, the UT said in its decision, Silverfleet “was not entirely outside the scope of VAT when the Services were rendered, but rather it was subject to a specific set of assumptions and disregards”.

    Pru contended that Silverfleet should not be considered to have made the supply in the course or furtherance of any business carried on by it. The business will instead be assumed to have been carried on by Pru. This was important because if VAT was applicable to the services Pru would not be in a position to recover it (in full at least) due to partial exemption which represented a large VAT cost.

    Unsurprisingly, HMRC considered that output tax was due because at the tax point, Silverfleet as no longer part of the VAT group. 

    Legislation

    The VAT Act 1994, section 43 lays down the rules in respect of VAT groups, and The VAT Regulations 1995, regulation 90 makes provision with respect to the time at which continuous supplies of services are to be treated as supplied for VAT purposes.

    Section 43 explains that any supply by one member of a VAT group to another is to be “disregarded” and that “any business carried on by a member of the group shall be treated as carried on by the representative member”. Does this mean that no VAT is chargeable on an intra-group supply regardless of whether the supplier has left the group by the time consideration for the supply is the subject of a VAT invoice and paid? Or is section 43 inapplicable in respect of continuous supplies insofar as the consideration is invoiced and received only after the supplier is no longer a member of the VAT group because regulation 90 provides for the services to be treated as supplied at the time of the invoice or payment?

    Decision

    The appeal was dismissed and HMTC’s assessment was upheld. It was not possible to disregard the supply as intra-group and the tax point rules for the continuous supply of services meant that it was a taxable supply. The decision was not unanimous, with the decision by the judges being a 2:1 majority.

    Commentary

    This was a close decision and highlights the necessity of considering the interaction between VAT groups and tax points and the implications of timings. The case makes interesting reading in full (well, for VAT people anyway!) for the technical discussions and the disagreement between the judges.